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PREFACE
It would be nice if I could write this thesis in a style
similiar to those cherished grade-school essays on "What I did
for my Summer Vacation." Just like the kid fresh back from the
mountains, I'm dying to raise my hand and tell everyone about my
time spent in graduate school studying economics. All the
marvelous and provocative ideas that I have come across through
the course-work and the thesis research seem just as magnificent
as any mountain or fishing hole. But most exciting have been
all of the informal conversations with the many people in this
department who have made it their business to study what seems
to me to be the most interesting of all studies, human action.
But this isn't grade school; I'm told that the child's
exuberance must give way to critical and emotionless thinking if
a thesis is to be taken seriously at all. But the grandeur and
insight contained in the works of writers like Shackle, Knight,
McCloskey, Keynes, Popper, and Mill has pushed my power of
emotionless thinking to the breaking point. Surely, the
seasoned economist will take exception to the many times in this
thesis when I have failed to suppress my astonished delight with
what these and other writers have said.
What's more, the seasoned economist might also object to
direction pursued in this study; there are no quantitative,
positive results for him to sink his teeth into. Most of what
is contained here are questions of the most general sort;
questions that I believe all scientists must ask themselves at
one point or another in their career. Before any "hard"
research is initiated, it seems prudent that the scientist, at
the beginning of his career, decide for himself just what he
expects his theory to deliver for him and how he expects the
theory to accomplish that. In my case, the purpose of theory is
twofold: First, it must satisfy my personal curiosity about the
way things work. Secondly, and more importantly, theory
should provide society with an apparatus or tool with which
problems can be solved. And the only way in which these dual
goals can be accomplished is through incessant, critical
discussion.
Thus, this thesis represents a prelimary attempt to come to
terms with some questions about economics that have dogged me
since my days of undergraduate study. As I hope the reader will
see, the area of risk and uncertainty research provides the
ideal backdrop for us to probe questions about the epistemic
standing of the assumptions in economic theory, and, the value
of the method economists have chosen to criticise the theories
they create.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the assistance and
support of those without whom this thesis would never have been
written. This thesis is dedicated to my undergraduate mentor,
Fr. Bertrand LaNoue, O.S.B. who was not only the first to ignite
ii
my love of economics, but also the first to say, "You can do
it." I am indebted to Dr. Bryan Schurle for his patient and
gracious assistance to me throughout my graduate program. My
committee members, Dr. Jeff Williams and Dr. Orlan Buller
also deserve my thanks for their suggestions and comments
which proved most helpful when thesis was in its earliest
stages. Also, I am grateful to Dr. John Riley who guided my
entry into K-State and followed my progress along the way.
Finally, I would like to lovingly thank my parents for
everything they have so unselfishly done for me. They taught me
to work hard, think positive, and to do it all in the name of
the Lord.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE i
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION 1
The Power of Method 1
Popper, Modernism, and Rhetoric 4
A Case Study: Non-Certainty Research
in Agriculture 9
In the Chapters which Follow 21
II. MODERNISM: ECONOMICS "OFFICIAL" METHODOLOGY . 24
Introduction 24
Modernism: Its the only Game in Town . . 26
The Origin of Economic Method 36
III. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERNISM ... 44
Introduction 44
Hume's Problem of Induction 47
Mill's Verif icationism 49
Popper's Falsificationism 58
The Modernist Notion of Objectivity. ... 64
IV. THE MODERNIST APPROACH TO ECONOMIC
NON-CERTAINTY 68
What is a Scientific Research Program? . . 68
What is Choice? 72
Non-Intuitive Sources of the NCRP 80
The Hard Core of the Modernist NCRP. . . 95
V. THE REAL RHETORIC BEHIND THE MODERNIST NON-
CERTAINTY RESEARCH PROGRAM 104
A Presentation of "Test" Results 104
A Prima-Facie Case against the NCRP. . . 106
The Epistemological Status of the NCRP. . 116
Conclusion 129
VI. CONCLUSION 131
BIBLIOGRAPHY 138
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION
1 .1 THE POWER OF METHOD
The problem of risk and uncertainty is one that has increas-
ingly occupied economists in recent years. This is not
suprising since risk and uncertainty have themselves occupied the
minds of men since the first real decision was ever made. What
is suprising is that it took economics so long to recognize the
impact that an uncertainty of the history-to-come has on the
decisions made by people like you and me. So how has economics,
the so-called "queen of the social sciences," come to terms with
the phenomena of uncertainty? To the average man-on-the-street
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the method by which economists deal with uncertainty would seem
very strange indeed. If Joe Farmer in Pawtucket, Kansas only
knew the way that economists have "modeled" his decision process,
he would surely shake his head and wonder "what in the world had
ever gotten into them fellas."
What this paper seeks to show is that "what has gotten into
them fellas" is a thing called scientific method. And, in the
case of agricultural non-certainty research, scientific method,
thanks to the economist's loyal and unquestioning allegiance to
it, has pushed the research in this critically important area to
the brink of irrelevance.
To illustrate the power that method can have on the content
and relevance of intelligent discussion, let us consider for a
moment an analogy that exists between scientific method and legal
process. In a particular court case, legal precedent requires
that the prosecution show beyond a "reasonable doubt" that person
A is in fact guilty of the crime as charged. The job of the
prosecutor is then to gather up as much evidence and as many
witnesses as possible in order to convince the judge and the jury
that Person A is indeed guilty of hideous crime X. But there are
certain rules that the prosecutor must follow in order to make
his case stick. The evidence must be gathered and presented in a
manner defined as acceptable by courts in the past. And these
standards are subject to change. What may be enough evidence at
one time may be insufficient in another. And if the criteria of
"reasonable doubt" suddenly became so strict that no crook,
however rotten, could be convicted and jailed for the crimes he
committed, then the ideal of "justice for all" would wither into
a pathetic joke. Court cases would no doubt continue to be heard
under such a system, but the relevance and meaning of the
decisions rendered would probably leave the public no recourse
but to take justice into their own hands.
But this is economics, not law. Economists build theories,
not legal cases; they don't try to throw people into jail. But
law and economics do share a common purpose: To seek, to
ascertain as best we can, and to defend the truth. It is
therefore not suprising that like law, science does have its own
codified version of what is required of a persuasive argument.
Known as the philosophy of science, it seeks, in a manner even
more precise than law, to provide criteria for the acceptance or
the rejection of scientific arguments.
It is true that a man's life can hang in the balance of a
legal decision, but a whole nation's well-being often depends on
economic policy choices. Hence, a great deal rides on the
standards by which economic arguments are judged. And if these
standards of persuasive argument set down by the philosophers and
adopted by economists are in reality impossible to adhere to,
then, just like the legal system where no man can be found
guilty, economics will degenerate into a pitiful charade.
Economics would at last become deserving of the epitath, "the
dismal science."
If such is the case, then two results seem most likely to
follow: First, the strictures of method will force economists to
heed at least the more conspicious requirements of scientific
method. In the methodology section of their papers, the
economists will pledge, like a magical incantation of respecti-
bility, their allegiance to the truth-revealing power of scienti-
fic method. But underneath this loyal exterior will lay the real
standards of argument, the economist's authentic criteria for
good research. But until the authority of method is overthrown,
these authentic standards will go undiscussed and undisclosed to
those who seek to make effective economic arguments of their own.
Secondly, the public will certainly perceive that something is
dreadfully wrong with the discipline they have counted on to
advise their policy makers of economic reality. Public confi-
dence in the worth of economic theory may fall to the point where
vigilante economics may appear to be the only available alterna-
tive. Economists may find themselves to be the silenced voice in
a world where economic policy is decided on the grounds of which
group happens to carry the biggest stick.
Clearly then, methodology possesses a tremendous amount of
power. It is with no small amount of urgency then, that this
thesis seeks to uncover just what damage the force of scientific
method has wreaked on the research in agricultural non-certainty.
1.2 POPPER, MODERNISM, AND RHETORIC
A tremendous amount of intellectual effort has gone into the
determination of the criteria necessary for persuasive scientific
argument, both in science in general and economics in particular.
Economists themselves, perhaps because they are haunted by an
inferiority complex regarding the "scientific" worth of their
discipline, have almost unconditionally accepted the rules of
persuasion as laid down by the philosophers of science and a sort
of "official" methodology has emerged.
The gist of this "official" methodology, to be refered to
hereafter as "modernism" (a term first used by McCloskey) is that
certain methodological (or argumentative) "rules" are required of
any argument in order for it to be deemed satisfactorily
scientific. These rules of argument in economics are the result
of the application of a particular, and very persuasive philoso-
phy of science that orginated with the German philosopher, Karl
Popper, who claimed, early in the twentieth century, that he had
solved the Humean problem of induction. As will be shown in
fuller detail later, the problem of induction is a problem of the
logical justification of beliefs held by people. "Hume was
interested in the status of human knowledge or, as he might have
said, in the question of whether any of our beliefs — and which
of them— can be justified by sufficient reason" (Popper, 1972,
P. 3).
Men routinely believe in certain regularities, like the belief
that the sun will rise tomorrow. Hume was convinced that the
belief that the sun will rise tomorrow could in no way be
logically justified because, even though the sun has always risen
in the past, such justification would require reasoning from the
particular to the general. Thus, Popper "solved" the problem of
induction by saying that induction does not exist. It is thus
impossible to induct (or prove) the truth of any proposition.
Therefore, all hypotheses, beliefs, assumptions (whatever we
choose to call them) are conjectural and without any basis in
truth unless the deductive consequences of those hypotheses can
be corroborated with phenomena in the real world.
In the Popperian system, the belief that the sun will rise
tomorrow is only justified if that belief is put to the test
every day. As time passes, that belief becomes corroborated
through repeated "experiments." It is this necessity of corrob-
oration with the real world that requires methodological rules to
specify proper modes of corroboration. Among these rules, the
most conspicuous one is that any scientific theory (or argument)
which is proposed must be objectively falsifiable. And the only
theories which are objectively falsifiable are those which make
predictions. It is not enough just to come up with an argumenta-
tive theory which makes predictions; the predictions themselves
must be tested against the phenomena of the objective world.
In this scheme, theories are like vessels which we seek to
fill with what Popper has called verismilitude (closeness to the
truth). It matters little whether or not the vessel is ornate or
simple, what is important is how much verismilitude the theory is
logically capable of holding and how much our experiments reveal
that it actually does hold.
Conceivably, therefore, the methodological rules of modernism
would be the acid test which would determine the value of
economic argument. This paper too, seeks to make a persuasive
economic argument. Hence, the reader might naturally expect this
testimony to be accompanied by reams of computer printout paper
and to be loaded with tables upon tables of regression results
which would document that the obligatory testing had in fact been
done. However, this writer would object vehemently to the
rejection of his case on the grounds that it does not conform to
the scientific "rules of law" if other economic theories were
routinely accepted and rejected by criteria different from the
"official" methodology. If "modernism" could be shown to be just
an aggregation of words that most theorists dutifully invoke in
the introduction of their papers and which are then quickly
forgotten, no economist should feel any obligation to follow such
an empty and illusory methodology. Rather, the writer would be
free to attempt to convince in the most persuasive manner he
could possibly devise.
Assume for the moment that such is the case; that the canons
of scientific methodology are empty and illusory. Assume that
however plausible they might appear to be, there are no laws of
scientific methodology that have not at some point in the history
of science been violated with impunity. Assume further that some
of the world's greatest scientists succeeded only because they
deliberately broke all the rules. If such is the case, by what
then should an economic argument be judged? Mathematical
complexity? Statistical dexterity? Verbal Obtusity? Certainly
not. While it is readily conceeded that sometimes these are the
necessary components of effective argument, they are not its
defining features. But if economic conversation clearly and
simply moves from point to point, carefully considering all of
the relevant supporting evidence, and deducing conclusions that
are justified by the evidence, then any reasonable person ought
to be persuaded by the results.
The art of persuading reasonable people is what is known as
rhetoric. Rhetoric as it is used here should not be confused
with the more common and derogatory use of the term which often
implies a lot of talk without action or i.e., a lot of hot air.
On the contrary, rhetoric as it is used here comes from the
ancient tradition of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian — each of
whom happened to be very persuasive people in their own right.
In Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent
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Wayne Booth defines
rhetoric in a number of ways: Rhetoric is "the art of probing
what men believe they ought to believe, rather than proving what
is true according to abstract methods"; it is "the art of dis-
covering good reasons, finding what really warrants assent, be-
cause any reasonable person ought to be persuaded"; it is careful
weighing of more-or-less good reasons to arrive at more-or-less
probable or plausible conclusions --none too secure but better
than would be arrived at by chance or unthinking impulse" (pp.
xiii. xiv, 59, quoted from McCloskey, p. 482).
One might then suppose that it ought to be a simple matter to
subsume the methodology of science as a species under the genus
rhetoric. Perhaps this can be done, but only with great caution.
The truth or falsity of the assumption above must first be
argued: It must be determined whether or not economists
themselves actually use and are persuaded by arguments which
exclusively adhere to the laws of the "official" methodology,
modernism. Also it should be recognized that the methodology of
science is directed towards a certain type of knowledge:
objective knowledge. But rhetoric is directed towards persu-
asion. Therefore, the methodology of science can be a self-
sufficent species of rhetoric only if the audience is persuaded
by only those arguments that are based on objective (or scienti-
fic) knowledge.
If it can be shown that the assumptions above are valid; that
economists, and all scientists for that matter, commonly are
persuaded by arguments not based on objectively falsifiable
theories, then the need for an "official" methodology disappears.
If such is the case, then the first question to be asked is
"Why?" Why should economists (remember, they are scientists) be
persuaded by anything less than hard theories with deductive
consequences that repeatedly stand up to attempts to falsify
them? Could it be that the economists recognize that this
objective knowledge, however attractive it may appear to be, is
in fact impossible to obtain? If this is so, then what does it
take to make a persuasive economic argument? Put in another way,
what are the real criteria whereby economic arguments and the
evidence which support them are accepted or rejected?
If the study of a particular research program reveals that
the "real" rhetoric of the discipline is indeed modernist, then
there is no problem and the value of this speculation
disintegrates. But if it can be shown that the "real" rhetoric
turns out to be different from the "official" standards of
persuasive scientific argument, then some hard questions need to
be asked. If such is the case, it would be most important that
economists recognize and be prepared to criticize the standards
of persuasive argument that they have set for themelves.
1.3 A CASE STUDY: NON-CERTAINTY RESEARCH IN AGRICULTURE
Like so many other studies, this thesis is a response to
economic arguments made in the past. In his 1983 article
entitled "The Rhetoric of Economics," Donald McCloskey issues
what amounts to a challenge to his collegues. He urges econo-
mists to critically reappraise the standards of effective
argument they have allowed the philosophers to set for them.
This challenge is based on three conclusions McCloskey has
reached about the state of "methodology" in economics. This
thesis seeks to corroborate McCloskey's conclusions by consi-
dering a particular research program in economics, agricultural
non-certainty research. McCloskey's three conclusions that we
will attempt to verify are as follows:
1) Economists don't practice what they preach in terms of
their methodology. Over the years, the "official" methodology of
economics has changed. But from Mill to Marshall to Friedman and
Samuelson, McCloskey argues that the most influential economists
rarely live up to methodological norms they extol (see also
Blaug, 1980). "And it is a good thing, too," McCloskey writes,
"If they did they would stand silent on human capital, the law of
demand, random walks down Wall Street, the elasticity of demand
for gasoline, and most other matters about which they commonly
speak. . .Economic science would stop progressing if the methodol-
ogy were in fact used" (p. 482).
2) The reason why economists do not adhere to their "offi-
cial" rhetoric in practice is that any method is in fact
impossible to follow. Reasoning from theories of knowledge and
notions of the ideal science, the philosophers have set rigid
limits defining which arguments are acceptable and which are not.
But by the very nature of its subject matter, economics can not
simultaneously fit those methodological norms and remain persu-
asive. To support this point, McCloskey argues that modernism a)
is now considered obsolete in philosophy, and b) is not followed
in the other "hard" sciences.
3) Since modernism has served as a cover for the rhetoric
of economics, the real rhetoric has gone unexamined. Just what
are considered acceptable arguments in economics is a question
that goes undiscussed. And whenever such a crucial feature of a
discipline goes unexamined, in this case the criteria for the
acceptance and the rejection of arguments, there is great danger
that the discipline might be lead astray and that growth will be
stunted.
But the breadth of economic thought makes it impossible to
examine carefully rhetoric of the entire discipline. The most
persuasive argument in support of McCloskey's assertions would be
to see how they stand up against a particular research program in
economics
.
"Oh no," the reader might exclaim, "Not another paper on
method." If so, the present writer shares your fatigue. It is
true that the library shelves are full of books on method. It is
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also true that, as J. N. Keynes has written, "that it is one
thing to establish the right method for building up a science,
and quite another to succeed in building it up" (p. 4). Keynes
was right about more than he realized. If McCloskey is right,
then building a method and building a science are two different
things because they are two mutually incompatible goals. Lest we
forget, economics is supposed to be more than just an academic
game pursued for no other reason than its intellectual attrac-
tion. Much of it is, and perhaps this is due to a passive
allegiance to a particular method, any method, which artificially
constrains discourse between reasonable people about real world
problems. It is more than just an interesting fact of intellec-
tual history that the writers who seemed most concerned about
directing their economics towards the betterment of mankind and
improvement in the wealth of nations were the very writers that
seem to most violate the canons of method which, often, they were
they very ones to set down (see McCloskey, p. 489). Therefore,
if this study of the rhetoric of non-certainty research can lead
to a more coherent discussion of the real phenomena of uncertain-
ty as it confronts decision-maker, then the trek through the
dark, dusty hallways of epistemology will have been worth it.
There are three reasons why non-certainty research was chosen
as program with which we would attempt to corroborate McCloskey's
conclusions. First, especially in ag-economics , risk research,
as measured by the number of journal articles which now incorpor-
ate risk, is growing.
Secondly, the modernist non-certainty research program (NCRP)
is a program that is clearly conceived in a modernist vein.
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Uncertainty is said to exist whenever an individual is uncertain
about the possible consequences of a given action. But the
essence of the modernist NCRP is that the uncertain decision-
maker is assumed to face a situation of risk, where he has the
power to calculate the probabilities of possible outcomes of his
decision. Though the actual research form varies greatly, from
MOTAD to E-V analysis to stochastic domiance criteria, the core
is essentially the same. We define modernist non-certainty
research as that set of theories which assumes that individual's
preferences follow the von Nuemann-Morganstern axioms of Order-
ing, Transitivity, and Independence. As a logical consequence of
this, individuals are assumed to form subjective probability
distributions about the possible consequences of specific acts.
The individual will choose that act which maximizes his expected
utility. Hence, if the theorist can estimate risk preferences
and subjective probability distributions, then it is possible
that behavior under uncertainty might be predictable. The NCRP
is clearly a program geared towards the modernist method.
This apparent loyalty to the modernist dogmas really isn't
all that startling since risk and uncertainty research began in
earnest at just about the same time that the modernist methodolo-
gy was being accepted by the economists. Friedman's landmark
essay "The Methodology of Positive Economics" and Samuelson's
influential Foundations of Economic Analysis appeared just a few
years after the Von Nuemann and Morganstern book Theory of Games
and Economic Behaviour . The former marked the beginning of the
acceptance of the modernist methodology and the latter showed
that predictions of behavior under risk were possible. Thus, the
current research in risk and uncertainty is in many ways the
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"baby" of the "official" methodology.
An examination of the offspring of the current methodology
provides an opportunity to view the "official" rhetoric in a
rather pure and unadulterated form. Unfortunately, the conse-
quences of that purity have been that the non-certainty research
program, by modernist standards, appears to be degenerating
rapidly. Thus, the third reason why the NCRP was chosen as the
illustrating case for McCloskey's argument is that uncertainty
seems to be a topic that clashes vividly and violently with the
nature of the modernist methodology, and it does so on essential-
ly two levels.
First, the metaphysical theory that the modernist methodology
is built on, has a peculiar relationship to uncertainty. Few
have stepped forward to challenge the applicability of Popper's
epistemogical theory of knowledge in economics, and the research
in risk and uncertainty creates a unique opportunity to do so.
That metaphysical theory, which Karl Popper advertised as the
solution to Hume's problem of induction, argues that knowledge is
never certain
,
and that it is always of a tentative sort. He
writes that "Thus the idea of truth is absolutist, but no claim
can be made for absolute certainty [my emphasis]: We are seekers
after truth but we are not its possessors" (1972, p 46).
And surely. Popper is correct. The uncertainty of scientific
knowledge is just as real as the uncertainty that grips the mind
of the decision-maker as he contemplates possible action schemes.
Popper seeks to show that even though induction does not exist,
reason still has a part to play in the growth of knowledge. If
men's beliefs can be transformed from the subjective to the
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objective and if the resulting conjectural theories can be put to
the falsifying test, then men can rationally choose those
theories that make the best predictions. Even Donald HcCloskey,
whose paper attacks modernism on all levels, concedes the appeal
of Popper's argument on a purely epistemological level (p. 486).
But in the case of economic behavior under risk and uncertainty,
using Popper's method of uncertain knowledge to study the
uncertain knowledge of economic actors seems a bit like using a
microscope to study a microscope.
As Popper has remarked, metaphysical theories are non-
demonstrable, but they can be argued. And a persuasive case
against modernism and the tenets it implies can be made by
comparing uncertainty in the real world with uncertainty in the
search for scientific knowledge. When they conjecture about
possible research designs, scientists trade risk of error and
truth-potential in the same way that the economic actor must
trade risk and expected income. In both cases, imagination and
reason work together: Imagination is the origininator of both
scientific hypotheses and the possible alternatives which a
decision-maker under uncertainty considers. Reason is used by
the scientist to formulate persuasive arguments, and, people
employ reason when making decisions. However, since imagination
is an inherently subjective phenomena, it is all but ignored by
the modernist rhetoric. If modernism requires that predictions
of human behavior under uncertainty are possible, and indeed,
necessary, then modernism should also contend that predictions of
scientific behavior are also possible and, indeed, necessary.
But of course, this fertile area of modernist research has not
yet been exploited. Who would dare to predict the future actions
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of a Pascal or an Einstein? Nobody. So why is the prediction
of economic behavior which exists under essentially the same
circumstances also attempted? What this paper argues is that
there is no good reason why.
The second level where the recognition of uncertainty clashes
noticiably with modernism is on the research level. We seek to
demonstrate that the non-certainty research program's attempt to
at least outwardly adhere to the tenets of modernism has greatly
stunted the growth of knowledge in the area.
In a modernist comparision between standard, neoclassical
certainty theory and non-certainty theory, certainty theory
clearly comes out on top. Certainty theories 1) are easier to
falsify, 2) generate predictions that are reproducible, 3)
explain long observed empirical regularities, like the law of
demand which non-certainty theory does not imply, and 4) focus on
markets rather than individuals so that the theories are more
vulnerable to inter-subjective testing. This is an odd, almost
perverse, result. By the rules of modernism, economists would be
better off sticking with certainty theory and ignoring risk.
When the economist accepts the tenets of modernism, it seems that
he forgoes any possibility of coming to terms with the phenomena
of uncertainty.
The NCRP is therefore a program which makes McCloskey's case
quite strong. On both the epistemological and the research
level, modernism is the inappropriate criteria to judge the
strength of arguments about human action. Yet the research in
risk continues, and is even growing. What can justify that
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growth? How have researchers in non-certainty managed to salvage
any respectibility in a discipline where modernism appears to
have set the standards of persuasive argument? The answer is
that they have given only a token nod to modernism, and that the
"real" rhetoric of the program is something quite different from
Popper's prescription that theories should always put to the
test.
In fact, the non-certainty research program seems to be
becoming less and less vocal with their allegiance to modernism.
In fact, because the falsification of theories in this field is
becoming increasingly difficult, many participants have now
openly opted for a normative approach over the positive. This
switch effectively dissolves any pretense that modernism is the
"real" rhetoric of the research program. It turns out that the
program is essentially held together by assumptions assumed to be
true on apriori grounds, which makes uncertainty theory no more
advanced than Mill's economic man of the 1860's.
Once the normative viewpoint of the program is recognized,
the search for the "real" rhetoric behind non-certainty research
can begin. It suddenly becomes possible to criticize the
assumptions on grounds that are not even conceivable when the
theories are assumed to be merely conjectural until corroborated
by falsifying tests. Since the approach is normative, the
intuitive palatability of the assumptions of the research program
can be attacked on a variety of levels.
The first question to be asked is whether or not the NCRP
explains that phenomena that caused economists to invent non-
certainty theory in the first place. Does uncertainty theory
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explain the method by which people make decisions under condi-
tions of uncertainty? More importantly, is it possible to
predict people's behavior under uncertainty?
If choice under uncertain circumstances is anything like we
subjectively perceive it, then the business of prediction reduces
choice to mere calculation, or i.e., determinism. Economists
themselves are plainly aware, as is everybody else, that what it
takes to be successful in the capitalist world (and life, for
that matter) is good judgement; prudence. Yet modernists
do not hesitate to completely abstract this crucial feature out
of the analysis; one decision-maker is assumed to be just as
prudent as the next. There is no model, no gambling game, and no
probability distribution that can take the place of prudence. No
argument can be pursuasive that assumes the importance of
prudence away.
When economists recognize the existence and nature of
uncertainty, they are bound to confront the fact that, as G. L.
S. Shackle has written, "Economics is about thoughts. It is
therefore a branch or an application of epistemics, the theory of
thoughts. Economics is concerned about thoughts about things,
both directly, when business men consider the intended uses of
their resources, and indirectly, when they consider and conjec-
ture each others thoughts about what to do with the resources
entrusted to them" (1972, preface).
But the non-certainty research refuses to recognize this
self-evident proposition. Why else would Professor Shackle, an
economist who has written a half a dozen books on uncertainty be
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all but ignored by the mainstream profession? Shackle is
persuasive for the very reason that he calls it like it is.
Uncertainty is a fact that comes with time. The act of choosing
among possible means to achieve given ends (read: economic
behavior) is not aided by probability distributions. Choice is
more human than that. It is folly to search for something that
can't exist.
Blinded by the canons of method, the modernist troopers have
struggled on under literally impossible odds, trying to predict
behavior that is inherently unpredictable. We are told that
Knight's distinction between risk (where we know the odds) and
uncertainty (where we don't) doesn't mean much anymore. The
golden rule of modernism is that all hypotheses are mere
conjectures without any basis in truth until predictions come
true which corroborate those conjectures. And if it takes the
transubstantiation of a decision from a situation of uncertainty
to a situation of risk to come up with predictions of behavior,
then so be it. This approach might be reasonable in the case of
a theory about the orbit of the planets, but in the case of
decisions under uncertainty, it is plainly unacceptable and
definately not persuasive. If the economist really is capable of
predicting what an economic actor will do under the conditions of
uncertainty that commonly face people in the real world, then
that economist ought to be rich. As McCloskey has written, "At
the margin (because that is where economics works) and on average
(because some people are lucky) the industry of making economic
predictions, which includes universities, earns only normal
returns" (p. 488). Yet, when their predictions fail, as they
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inevitably must, the modernist militia always say, "We know our
empirical methods are imperfect. But you have to crawl before
you can walk." But of course, one doesn't want to crawl off the
edge of the table either.
Given the impossibility of their situation, it is not
suprising that the modernists have sunk to methods which
aren't very persuasive. The problem of what Learner has called
"adhocery" is rampant in non-certainty research:
"Theoretical econometrics nearly always proceeds as if there
were a single, 'known' model that correctly describes the
probability distribution [which the decision-maker faces].
What are unknown are only the values of some parameters in
the known model... The sooner [we recognize] that nearly all
applied work is shot through with applications of uncertain,
subjective knowledge. . .the better" (Sims, in a review of
Learner's book Ad hoc Inference , p. 566, 567).
Even beyond the problems of adhocery, there is reason to
wonder whether the single, known model postulated by the applied
econometricians actually does, or even can, exist. The litera-
ture just assumes that people form subjective probability
distributions when making decisions. Rarely, is the cogency of a
subjective probability distribution questioned. Do individuals
attach probabilities to possible states of nature in such a
manner that all the probabilities add to unity? A number of very
vexing questions immediately suggest themselves if such is the
case. How does the decision-maker put a probability value on
those outcomes which he has yet to imagine? What probability
value corresponds with the most likely outcome? Why should the
probability of one possible outcome be affected by the probabili-
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ty of another possible outcome?
What the analysis forces us to conclude is that the NCRP has
boxed itself into a very tight corner. On one hand, the NCRP
decidedly fails the modernist test of persuasiveness. And on the
other, when we accept the NCRP's normative approach, the
assumptions of the theory simply do not stand up to apriori
scrutiny. In the end, one wonders just what contribution the
research program is capable of making to man's stock of under-
standing about economic behavior. It appears that it is the
attempted adherence to the modernist strictures which has pushed
the NCRP to the brink of irrelevance.
Finally, the title of this paper mentioned that the rhetoric
under consideration here is the rhetoric of agricultural non-
certainty. Since most of the analysis in this paper can be
easily generalized to decision theory in a variety of situations,
the specific inclusion of agriculture in the title warrants an
explanation. First, the tremendous variability that farmers
face, from the weather and the insects to prices and costs, has
created an urgent need for an economics of uncertainty in
agricultural economics. Just as farmers deal with risk continu-
ally, it seems that ag-economists are, and justifiably so, very
interested in the economic impacts of stochastic phenomena.
The second reason is perhaps more important than the first.
Agricultural economics is an applied science; the general
procedure is to adapt and apply approaches developed elsewhere in
economic theory. Consequently, in their haste to provide useful
analysis for the farmer and the policy maker, there is a danger
that the methods of research will be applied uncritically. Thus,
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there appears to be a need to address some of the questions about
non-certainty theory that are too often passed over. It is hoped
that, in particular, the agricultural economist will benefit from
this analysis.
1.4 IN THE CHAPTERS WHICH FOLLOW...
In short, this paper seeks to show that the research in
agricultural non-certainty is headed for non-relevance fast and
that modernism is the reason why. In what follows, meat will be
added to the bare-bones arguments which have been given here.
The organizational scheme to be used in the following chapters is
not dissimiliar to that applied in many quantitative research
reports. Modernism is, after all, a model (a model of models,
perhaps). Hence, the first chapter roughly coincides with the
aim of the traditional "Review of the Literature" chapter. In
the same way that a "Review of the Literature" chapter would
attempt to justify the use of a particular empirical approach,
Chapter II endeavors to demonstrate that modernism is indeed the
"official" methodology of economics (which includes, of course,
non-certainty research). By showing that modernism is the
"official" rhetoric of economics, the way is set for a compari-
sion of the research in agricultural non-certainty with the
modernist standards of science.
The third chapter contains the development of the model.
Herein, the methodology of modernism is built from Hume's problem
of induction on up. Modernism is compared and contrasted with
the methodology of verif icationism that it supplanted as the
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"official" model of economic research some thirty years ago.
In Chapter IV, the specific application of the modernist
model to the theory of decision under uncertainty is considered.
The chapter opens with some preliminary remarks on the components
of a scientific research program. In order to get to the "hard
core" of the modernist non-certainty research program, the two
fundamental sources of uncertainty theory are discussed: First,
part of the reason for uncertainty theory in the first place is
that economists would like to explicitly come to terms with the
subjective feelings of uncertainty that we all have about the
future. This prompts us to ask the question, "What is choice?"
Second, because there are a number of phenomena in the real world
that can not be explained unless we assume that individuals were
adapting to conditions of uncertainty, there is a desire to
create such a theory. Finally, the chapter closes with a
presentation of the defining features of the modernist non-
certainty research program.
Chapter V is in a way a presentation of results. Given that
modernism is the accepted methodology of economics, and given
that modernist economists have developed a theory of decision-
making under uncertainty, how well does this non-certainty theory
stand up to the modernist rules of persuasive scientific
argument? We conclude that, by its very nature, research in non-
certainty violates some of the fundamental tenets of the
modernist rhetoric. At this point, the search for the real
rhetoric behind the non-certainty research begins. The chapter
closes with a critique of that rhetoric.
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Chapter VI is, as one might expect, a conclusion that
sums the results thus far and makes suggestions for further
research. Most importantly, the chapter points to non-
certainty research as an example of what loyal acceptance
to the modernist method can do to the content of a research
program. What the chapter advocates is an abandonment of a
rhetoric that requires prediction at all times. Also, there
is a plea for economists to become more aware of the criteria
of persuasiveness that, in no small way, define the essence
of a discipline. Finally, the paper closes with a suggestion
for a rhetoric of economics aimed at persuasion rather than
prediction.
In all, this paper seeks to wind together three different
strands of thought; rhetoric, choice, and uncertainty. Along
the way, however, it will be necessary to unwind modernism.
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CHAPTER II.
MODERNISM: ECONOMICS' "OFFICIAL" METHODOLOGY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Historically, studies in scientific methodology have
primarily sought to specify the criterions of good scientific
argument. In addition to this, methodological studies have been
used to explain the historic development of persuasive scientific
argument. Hence, methodology is a two-edged sword: It provides
"how to" assistance to the scientist and it offers rules by which
competing scientific theories can be appraised. Whether or not
this sword is made of tin or steel is not the question at hand.
The aim of methodology is simply to establish and enforce "the
rules of the game." The "object" of the game is to pursuade your
collegues that in fact the theory you defend is indeed the
champion. Scientific progress, viewed in this light, chronicles
the defeat of older scientific arguments by newer ones still
unbloodied by the sword of methodology.
The ancients termed the art of good argument "rhetoric."
Their lofty conception of rhetoric, with Aristotle and Cicero as
exemplaries, requires divorcing the essence of the word in the
classical sense from the derogatory implications that the word
"rhetoric" carries today. In a recent article by Donald
McCloskey, "The Rhetoric of Economics," rhetoric in the original
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sense is said to be "a fine and honorable word" and should be
treated as such. McCloskey calls rhetoric the art of
"disciplined conversation." And inasmuch as scientific
methodology is used to determine the demarcation between good
and bad scientific practice, such methodology is a particular
type of rhetoric meant to apply in the particular sphere of
scientific conversation.
As in law, a body of methodological precedent has
historically evolved out of the stirred-up dust of theoretical
controversy. But since the early fifties, despite multitudinous
theoretical dust storms that of late appear to be growing in both
fury and frequency, the methodological norms of economic research
have become progressively more codified, and are treated now
almost as if they were irrevocably set in stone on the day of
creation. In order to show that the last sentence is no
hyperbole, this chapter will begin with a brief examination of
the pervasity of the codified rhetoric which McCloskey has termed
"modernism." The first commandment of modernism is that all
scientific theory, including that of economics, must be
formulated in such a way that the theory is capable of being
falsified by empirical data. The second commandment is that only
those theories which have resisted efforts of falsification can
be accepted.
Since it is the purpose of this paper to examine the rhetoric
of the research in agricultural non-certainty, the next step in
the chapter is to explicitly set forth the justifications for, and
the criterions of, scientific method. Why do economists believe
that we need method at all? By answering this question, the
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justification for the rules by which the uncertainty research
will be appraised (in Chapter 3) will have been set forth
unambiguously. Pursuant to this, it is necessary to consider
briefly the methodological precedents that modernism has
replaced. This chapter makes no effort to challenge modernism's
claim as the rhetoric actually employed by economists. Nor does
the chapter challenge the justification for any methodology
whatever. These challenges will come later when we examine the
research in agricultural non-certainty from the sterile light of
pure modernism. The purpose here is only to distill the essence
of modernism from the vast crock of philosophic thought that has
gone into the making and defense of the "official" rhetoric of
economics
.
2.2 MODERNISM: IT'S THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN
Research in economics typically begins with what is termed a
"statement of methodology." By this the researcher seeks to set
forth and defend the method he has chosen to tackle the problem
at hand. The methodology chapter is important, we are usually
told, because it is "imperative that the economist should seek to
define as accurately as possible the nature and limits of his
sphere of inquiry" (p. 3). John Neville Keynes penned that
statement in his book on methodology, and surely he and the
methodology-chapter writers are correct. The tools of the trade
must be understood if economics wishes to add anything meaningful
to man's stock of understanding.
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But what this section seeks to show, is that for all intents
and purposes, modernism is treated as if it was the only tool in
the box. In other words, the mainstream opinion is that it is
only the formulation of theories with empirically refutable
consequences (i.e., predictions of human behavior) that can
build the science of economics. This widespread acceptance is
demonstrated here by looking at 1) the introductory textbooks,
2) the books on methodology, and, 3) in the case of agricultural
non-certainty research, texts and survey articles which
summarize the state of the art in that area. In fact, the
orthodox economist has little choice except modernism; the
business of making economic predictions has become the sine qua
non of nearly all (publishable) economic research.
The young economist first ecounters modernism in the first
chapter of nearly every introductory textbook in the discipline.
Here he is usually introduced to four facts of economic theory.
First, he is told that economics seeks answers to economic
problems. An economic problem, as Friedman has written, "exists
whenever scarce resources are used to satisfy alternative ends"
(1953, p. 6). Next, the student will usually read a
woeful description of the procedural difficulties associated
with a science where laboratory experimentation is impossible.
Third, and this is the clincher, our fledgling economist is
told, in words such as the following used by Mansfield in his
popular introductory text, that "The basic procedure [of
economics] is the formation of models. A model is composed of a
number of assumptions from which conclusions --or predictions--
are deduced ...the most important test of a model is how well it
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predicts these phenomena" (p. 13-14). Of course it is true, the
reader is quickly assured, "that the real test of a theory is its
ability to illuminate reality" (Samuelson, p. 10).
However, there is but one path to such insight or "illumination,"
and that is the predictive power of economic theories.
Consequently, the reader is urged to look upon economists,
to use Friedman's metaphor (1953, p 8), as file clerks of
human behaviour. Economic theories should "serve as a filing
system for organizing empirical matter and facilitating our
understanding of it" (p. 7). In this scheme, economic
theory would take on the cosmos of human behaviour as if it was a
great stack of paper of all different sizes and colors with an
infinite variety of languages and pictures written upon it. Such
theory would, in a manner similiar to zoology or botany, classify
the variety of human behaviour by separating the "stack of paper"
into categories possessing distinct qualities. Such an approach
would provide insight; we would realize that the great stack of
paper is indeed not as chaotic as it might appear to be as it
sits on our worldly desk. The usefulness of the filing
classifications depends on the the number of cross-references
required to make the system consistent and complete; the filing
system is mere tautology unless the classif icatory divisions are
capable of being tested via predictive experimentation.
And though there are no guaranteed paths to insight, the
reader is assured that economics is a science like all the other
"hard" sciences. Both seek the same goal. Both gain their
methodology by the application of the philosophy of science
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applied to a particular sphere of inquiry. All scientists are
file clerks of one sort or another; the natural human response to
chaos has always been to attempt to classify the diveristy of
experience. A cogent classif icatory scheme (or, stereotypes that
really fit) will yield insight. Indeed, throughout its history,
all of science has endeavored to render explanation out of chaos:
"It is the desire for explanations that are at once systematic
and controlled by factual evidence that generates science; and it
is the organization and classification of knowledge on the basis
of explanatory principles that is the distinctive goal of the
sciences" (Nagel, p. 4).
Fourth, and finally, the student is warned against putting
too much stock into the validity of the assumptions. "Economists
build," to quote Nicholson's introductory text, "rather
simplified models (usually mathematical) which are intended to
more or less represent reality" (p. 35). But the important thing,
to use another one of Friedman's illustrations, is not whether
the expert billard player actually does calculate geometrically
all of the angles of the shots facing him, but rather, whether he
acts .as. i£ he calculated those angles. The intuitive
palatability of the assumptions is only an indirect test of a
theory, which is subservient to the test of predictive accuracy.
One would expect that the methodological norms set forth in
the introductory texts are reflections of the accepted books on
methodology. And such is usually the case. The libraries are
loaded with books on economic methodology that argue for
modernism. The first that comes to mind is Friedman's 1953 essay
"The Methodology of Positive Economics" which marks in many
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respects the watershed for the acceptance of the tenets of
modernism in economics. Yet to mention Friedman first is to
bypass one of the original proponents of modernism, Terrence
Hutchison. His 1938 book J&ft Significance and Basic Postulates o_£
Economic Theory represents one of the first attacks on apriori
reasoning and it argues for predictive tests of theoretical
constructs. Hutchison's latest book, The Politics and Philosophy
of Economics (1981) shows that his views have changed little over
the years. Also recently, Mark Blaug's 1980 book, The
Methodology of Economics, or How Economists Explain , could easily
be retitled to Mto Economists must Predict . Since this section
is concerned only with the pervasity of modernism, these writers
will be examined in greater detail later on. But the point is
that when it comes to discussions of methodology, most of the
conversation today revolves around either some of the finer
points of modernism or the critisism of theorists who fail to
formulate their theories in such a way as would make them capable
of testing. If such were not the case, problems of methodology
wouldn't be so hastily mentioned in the first chapter of economic
textbooks for undergraduates. As Blaug writes "For the most
part, the battle for [modernism] has been won in modern economics
(would that we could say as much about some of the other social
sciences). The problem is now to persuade economists to take
[modernism] seriously" (1980, p. 260).
Nevertheless, different areas of research adhere to the
tenets of modernism in different degrees. So, before going
through the long and involved discussion of exactly what
30
modernism is, it seems prudent to first check and make sure that
modernism is indeed the "official" rhetoric of the research in
agricultural non-certainty. Perhaps the most expedient method of
doing this is to briefly review some of the methodological
conventions as presented in texts and survey articles in the
field.
Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel Laureate who has written widely on
the theory of decision under uncertain prospects, lends credence
to the belief that the current risk research is conceived in a
modernist vein. In the 1959 article "Functions of a Theory of
Behavior Under Uncertainty," Arrow sets forth the essential
problem confronting economists willing to face up to the
existence of uncertainty. He argues that economists deal with
uncertainty for two reasons. First, there is the sub iective
feeling of unknowledge about the future that we all perceive and
secondly, there is the objective existence of certain phenomena
in human affairs that would never occurr in the world of perfect
certainty. Arrow points out "that these two viewpoints interplay,
of course, as indeed the subjective and objective viewpoints
always do in the social sciences. We interpret the actions of
others by sympathetic understanding generated by an imagined
perception of our own actions in similiar situations." Then
Arrow sets the methodological tone for the research in non-
certainty by adding in parentheses that "To be sure, any such
interpretations are only hypotheses which must be verified by
their ability to predict human behavior" (p. 12).
And Arrow is not alone. The further one probes into the
research in non-certainty, the more convincing becomes the
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argument that the risk and uncertainty research has accepted the
modernist precepts. For example, consider the 1971 book by two
agriculture economists, Albert Halter and Gerald Dean's Decisions
Under Uncertainty (with Research Applications) Their book is
intended for ag-econ research, which makes it particularly
appropriate to the question at hand. The authors write that "The
purpose of modern decision theory is to provide a systematic
approach to decision making under conditions of imperfect
knowledge" (p. 1). So far so good, they are seeking something
akin to Friedman's filing system. But the crucial question is
whether or not they are going to demand that the theory be
formulated in falsifiable manner. The authors are elusive on
this issue, they are quick to point out that their' s is a book
meant for application of the concepts of decision theory rather
than the testing of the theory per se . However, in the
concluding chapter of their book, the authors argue that it is
indeed impossible, however difficult the task of prediction may
be, to evade the edicts of modernism. They write that "the
social scientist must be a more careful observer than his
counterpart in the physical sciences, and that he must be more
critical of his data. [But] this does not mean that hypotheses
can not be tested in the social sciences; it just means the
analyist must try harder to refute his hypotheses" (p. 239). We
can safely assume that these words were intended to apply to
the narrow case of non-certainty research.
A still more recent example, John D. Hey's Uncertainty in
Microeconomics (1979), adds weight to the notion that uncertainty
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theorists have embraced the methodology of modernism. In his
introduction, Hey writes "As is now common-place in economics, we
will follow the axiomatic approach; that is, we start with a set
of axioms, which appear attractive in the light of our intuitive
notions of 'rational behavior'. On the foundations of these
axioms we construct our theory, a theory that will enable us to
characterize the behavior of any individual who obeys the axioms,
and more importantly, a theory that will enable us to predict how
that individual will act in new situations" (p. 26).
A final example is the 1979 Proceedings Issue of the AJAE .
In his opening address, President Richard King exhorts his
collegues to continue working on "establishing explicit,
refutable, hypotheses" (p. 840). Later in the issue, as part of
a general session on risk management and risk preferences, four
different articles, all intended to summarize and comment on the
state of the art in agricultural non-certainty research, argue
implicitly for the necessity of modeling in order to predict.
The word "implicitly" is used above because none of the four
discussants (Young, Mapp et al., Bessler, Miller, and Sonka) ever
overtly state that prediction is the purpose of the research they
are discussing, but the fact is obvious from the methods they
advocate. The authors present a number of conventions from which
to choose: 1) Gaming approaches in the Von Nuemann and
Morganstern vein are used to estimate producer risk preferences.
2) Given some assumed risk preferences of producers, programming
models are developed to estimate optimal farm plans under
conditions of risk 3) One of the most advanced techniques
currently in use applies stochastic dominance criteria to
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empirical data in order to isolate risk efficient farm plans. 4)
Finally, questionaires are often sent out to representative
farmers in order to get a "feel" for how much variabilitiy the
producers are experiencing.
For those with a background in statistics and econometrics,
these conventions are a heartening invitation to research. All
are quantitative in one form or another. All seek predictive
results of some kind. All can be swept together under the
methodological carpet of modernism.
Finally, perhaps the best way to illustrate the place that
modernism occupies in the research in agricultural non-certainty
is to focus for a moment on what the mainstream has excluded,
rather than what they have included, as acceptable method. One
particular author, G.L.S. Shackle has spent his entire
professional life writing books and journal articles about the
existence and impact of uncertainty on economic actors. At
first, it is most suprising that he is never quoted in the non-
certainty research in ag-econ. The present writer has only
managed to find one citation in the Ag journals for Professor
Shackle (See Boussard, 1967). This is most suprising considering
the fact that this man has written books with titles like
Uncertainty in Economics
,
Expectation in Economics . Decision
,
Order, and Time in Human Affairs , Imagination, Formalism and
Choice
,
among others. He is like his modernist colleagues in his
sympathetic understanding of the impact that uncertainty has on
human behavior. Just as much as they, Shackle sees it as
critically important that economic theory incorporate uncertain
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prospects into it's theoretical framework. Why then, this
ostracism? The only possible reason is that Shackle has
steadfastly refused to accept one crucial element that dominates
the agricultural non-certainty research, prediction and "falsifi-
cationism," i.e., modernism. In his Expectation in Economics
,
Shackle writes the words that will forever separate him and his
work from the on-going research in agricultural non-certainty.
Shackle's contempt for the idea of the possibility and desirabi-
lity of predicting human action is nothing less than heresy to
modernists. He writes
"Complete prediction would require the predictor to
know in complete detail at the moment of making his
prediction, first, all 'future' advances of knowledge
and inventions, and, secondly, all 'future'
decisions. To know in advance what an invention will
consist of is evidently to make that invention in
advance" (p. 103-104).
"Predictability of the world's future history implies
predictability of decisions, and this is either a
contradiction in terms or an abolition of the concept of
decision except in a perfectly empty sense. .
.
Predicted
man is less than human, predicting man is more than
human" (p. 104).
Of course it is possible that the ag-economists have simply
overlooked Shackle and his work. It is really impossible to tell
from their silence whether this is due to his anti-modernist
methodology or for some other reason. However, Blaug in his book
on methodology does briefly mention Shackle just long enough to
"repudiate such anti-[modernist ] conclusions" (1980, p. 185). It
is with a fair degree of confidence then that we can assume that
the silence on Shackle is just another indication of the
acceptance of modernism in the non-certainty research camp.
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Shackle himself will be dealt with in greater detail later
on. The point of this section was only to justify the use of
modernism to evaluate the progress of the research in
agricultural uncertainty. By showing that modernism is indeed
the "official rhetoric" of economics in general and non-certainty
work in particular, the groundwork has been laid for a more
complete treatment of modernism and what this means for the
content of economic conversation.
2.3 THE ORIGIN OF ECONOMIC METHOD
This section examines the origin of statements on methodo-
logy. As such, we might consider this part of the paper to be
somewhat of a digression from the primary theme. However, a
consideration of the origin of methodological thought need not
mire itself in the long history of methodological questions.
Instead, the question addressed here is short and simple: Why
have economists deemed an understanding of methodology to be an
essential prerequisite to economic theorizing?
Again and again, we find that books on methodology (and, as
we saw in the previous section, introductory textbooks in
economics) seem to begin with apologetic arguments about the
worth of methodological discussion. And this is understandable;
scientists are much more comfortable working as discoverers of
scientific knowledge than just talking about scientific
"discovery." But the detractors of methodology have their
point, as Paul Feyerabend put it, methodology is "one of those
bastard subjects... which have not a single discovery to their
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credit" (p. 302). Scientific methodology is, after all, a branch
of philosophy and even the modernist founder, Karl Popper, felt
he needed to apologize for it: "Apart perhaps from some
Marxists, most professional philosophers seem to have lost touch
with reality .. .Under these circumstances there is a need to
apologize for being a philosopher..." (1972, p. 33).
Perhaps the first function of science is problem solving.
And towards that end, methodology might be viewed as a handy aid
for scientists to apply in their mission as problem solvers.
Popper, with his usual eloquence, writes
"Our main concern in philosophy and in science should
be the search for truth. Justification is not an aim;
and brilliance and cleverness as such are boring. We
should seek to see or discover the most urgent problems,
and we should try to solve them by proposing true
theories. . .or at any rate by proposing theories which
come a little nearer to the truth than those of our
predecessors" (1972, p. 44).
Consequently, if a clear idea of methodology could make us
more productive in the recognition of problems, coming to terms
with their nature, and in the conjecture of true (or at least,
better) theories regarding those problems, then the time spent
with methodology might be well worth the effort involved.
F.S.C. Northrup, on the first page of his book on methodology,
remarks on the cost of failing to respect the laws of scientific
discovery .
"Again and again, investigators have plunged into a subject
matter, sending out questionaires
,
gathering a tremendous
amount of data, even performing experiments, only to come out
in the end wondering what it all proves, and realizing that
after years of industry and effort that the real difficulty
has slipped through their fingers. Others noting the success
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of a given scientific method in one field, have carried this
method hastily and uncritically into their own, only to end
later on in similiar disillusionment. All such experiences
are a sign that the initiation of an inquiry has been passed
over too hastily, without any appreciation of its importance or
its difficulty" (p. 1 ).
Surely, the above seems to be a sufficiently emphatic and
persuasive exhortation on behalf of methodology. But there is
more. In the case of economics, there are other forces at work
which, owing to the peculiarities involved in discussions of
human action, have prompted frequent methodological discussions
from economists.
The first and most powerful of these forces is the
relationship between economics and the natural sciences; even
today, economists still argue about whether or not the study of
human behavior should be treated as qualitatively distinct from
the study of physical objects and their properties. As we know,
the natural sciences gain in knowledge by the controlled
experimental testing of theories. Also, economists are well
aware of the difficulties associated with experimentation in the
social sciences. The consensus among economists today, which
seems to have emerged from Friedman's Essays in Positive Econo-
mics is that "the inability to conduct so-called 'controlled
experiments' does not... reflect a basic difference between the
social and physical sciences" (1953, p. 10).
Therefore, it is not suprising that economists are somewhat
defensive of their adoption of the methods of the natural
sciences. The fact is, as George Shackle writes, that modern
economics itself has evolved from the methods of the natural
sciences
.
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"Economic theory for two-hundred years modelled itself
increasingly on the science of the inanimate creation;
upon celestial mechanics for its large-scale conception
and upon the isolable, purifiable experiment for the
small-scale. The end-product was the neo-classical
conception of the general equilibrium, the economic
system fully adjusted to an underlying body of complete
relevant knowledge. Such a method and its models have
given us sharp and brilliant tools of illuminations,
lightning flashes in which the scene is stilled to
immobility by the brevity of the glimpse" (1972, p. 4).
But this union between the study of man and the study of
nature has not been a completely harmonious one. There are
radical differences in the subject matter in the two instances.
Hence, the origin of economic methodology is first of all an
effort to encourage economists to continue to imitate the methods
of the natural sciences. Friedman writes that "no experiment can
be completely controlled [this is in reference to the problems
with experimentation that frequently occurr in the natural
sciences.] Evidence cast up by experience is abundant and
frequently as conclusive as that from contrived experiments;
the inability to conduct experiments is not a fundamental
obstacle to testing hypothesis." Friedman exhorts his collegues
to continue the struggle against the problems associated with
data from the real world; it is "difficult to interpret. It is
frequently complex and always indirect and incomplete. Its
collection is often arduous, and its interpretation requires
subtle analysis and involved chains of reasoning, which seldom
carry real conviction" (1953, p. 10). What this means is that it
is precisely the difficulties associated with interpreting the
phenomena associated with human behavior from the light of the
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natural sciences which has begotten methodological discussions in
economics
.
However, there is another reason why the binding strictures
of the natural sciences have been applied to economics and that
is because of the existence of what we might call "truck-driver"
economics. Of course, by this, no offense is meant to over-the-
road personnel; we simply seek to point out that misconceptions
abound in economics because, as Friedman put it "The subject
matter of economics is regarded by almost everyone as vitally
important to himself and within the range of his own experience
and competence; it is the source of continuous and extensive
controversy and the occasion for frequent legislation" (1953, p.
3).
In addition, as Neville Keynes said, "A not unnatural
consequence is that people think themselves competent to reason
about economic problems, however complex, without any such
preparatory scientific training that would universally be
considered in other departments of enquiry" (p. 7). Thus, given
the complexity and the material importance of economic events, we
have a propensity for what we have called truck-driver economics.
Perhaps the avoidance of truck-driver economics has been an
even more powerful impetus to the growth of economic methodology
than Popper's rather plutonic sounding desire for truth, which
was mentioned above. In a society founded on democratic
capitalism, the crucial policy issues cry out for careful,
objective treatment. The fact that we have discussions of
methodology now is testament to the fact the problems of society,
and the difficulties associated with those problems, require
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careful methodological treatment. Because of this, we expect
economists to present society with a more balanced analysis of
social problems relating to scarcity. What we have then is a
mandate for a "positive economics" which as J.N. Keynes defined
it, is a search after "what is," not what ought to be. Keynes'
Cambridge collegue, Alfred Marshall, describes what this
"positive" economist ought to do.
"The economist should study mental states rather through
their manifestations than in themselves; and if he finds
they afford evenly balanced incentives to action, he treats
the prima facie as for his purposes equal. He follows
indeed in a more patient and thoughtful way, and with
greater precautions, what everybody is always doing everyday
in ordinary life. He does not attempt to weigh the real
value of the higher affectations of our nature against those
of our lower: he does not balance the love for virtue
against the desire for agreeable food. He estimates the
incentive to action by their effect just in the same way as
people do in common life. He follows the course of ordinary
conversation, differing from it only in making clear the
limits of his knowledge as he goes" (p. 16).
Marshall's conception of the economist is the ideal. But
recall from Friedman that this task is made immensely difficult
by the nature of the subject matter. It is the economist's search
for guidance in this endeavor that has lead him to the door of
the philosophers of science. For the last thirty years,
economists have stood at the feet of the great philosphers of
science, most notably Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos, and have
been tutored in the ways and means of scientific conversation.
In the last page of his book on methodology, Blaug reveals just
what it is that the economists are looking for.
"What methodology can do is to provide criteria for the
acceptance and rejection of research programs, setting
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standards that will help us to discriminate between
wheat and chaff. The ultimate question we can and
indeed must pose about any research program is the one
made familiar by Popper: what events, if they
materialized, would lead us to reject that program. A
program that cannot meet that question has fallen short
of the highest standard that scientific knowledge can
attain" (1980, p. 264).
Therefore, we can conclude that the origin of scientific
methodology is really two-fold: on one hand it is the desire of
the social scientist to push his discipline to the rigour (and
prestige) of the physical sciences. On the other, methodology is
a tool that is used to combat the peculiar tendencies of people
to distort the truth in matters of wealth and scarcity. As we
saw in the previous section, economists are admiring students of
the thought of the philosophers of science to such a degree that
today there is a fear that to abandon Popper's methodology is
tantamount to abandoning economics to the demagogues and
merchants who would like to use the weight of the discipline to
their own advantage. McCloskey writes,
"If we abandon the notion that econometrics is by itself
a method of science in economics, if we admit that our
arguments require comparative standards, if we agree
that personal knowledge of various sorts plays a part in
economic knowledge, if we look at economic arguement
with a literary eye, will we not be abandoning science
to its enemies: Will not scientific questions come to
be decided by politics or whim: Is the routine of
Scientific Method not a wall against irrational and
authoritarian threats to inquiry? Are not the
barbarians at the gates?" (p. 509).
It is the fear that people just can't be disinterested with
regard to economic questions that seems to cause this great
allegiance to method. This paper is an investigation into the
rhetoric of non-certainty research. Yet the first commandment of
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rhetorical discussion is that the discussants be reasonable
people. Could it be that the reason why we hear so little talk
of the "rhetoric of economics" be that we simply don't trust each
other? If this is the situation, then there is little hope for
intelligent conversation and there is the very real possibility
for what one philosopher of science, Imre Lakatos, termed elitism.
"When once the conception of objective truth is abandoned, it is
clear that the question of 'what we shall believe' is one to be
settled by the appeal of force and the arbitration of big
battalions" (p. 119).
Clearly then, the stakes associated with methodology are
high. If the origin of methodology is indeed fear (which makes
the "sword of methodology" metaphor used at the begining of this
chapter seem particularly apt now) , and if that fear is
justified, then we ought to be mercilessly aware of the
degree of predictive power contained in scientific theories. If
methodology is all there is to keep the barbarians out, then we
should embrace that sword with a vengeance. But this is getting
ahead of the story. Modernism has not yet been given more than
just the briefest mention. In the next chapter, this will be
remedied by detailing the roots and implications of modernism
first from the realm of pure science and then from the specific
area of economics.
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CHAPTER III.
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERNISM
3.1 INTRODUCTION.
Thus far, it has been said repeatedly that the core of the
doctine of falsification (modernism) is that scientific theories
must, if they are at all to approach the truth, make predictions
that can be objectively tested against the phenomena that they
seek to explain. The overriding question of this chapter then is
"Why?" Why is it necessary that scientists build theories that
make predictions? Secondarily, despite the fact that modernism
has been shown to be the "official" rhetoric of economics, do
alternative methodologies exist that offer equal opportunity for
truth-seeking scientists? Or, just what has modernism got that
makes it such a preeminent force in methodological thought?
And if there is to be one man whose name and thoughts will
dominate this chapter, that man is Karl Popper. His 1934 book
The Logic of Scientific Discovery marks a major watershed in the
philosophy of science. The mere labelling of his doctrine of
falsification with the general term "modernism" is testament
enough to the force and impact of this man's ideas on the
philosophers and practitioners of scientific conversation.
Since 1934, as one might expect, a legion of disciples have
arisen from Popper's shadow and the result has been that his
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doctrine of falsification has become a bit blurred around the
edges. The result is that among adherents to the principles of
falsification (modernism) , there is no generic brand that is
universally accepted. This presents a problem as it is not
within the scope of this paper to detail the subtle philosophical
differences between theorists. Since the purpose of this chapter
is to present and discuss the methodology of modernism in
reasonably exhaustive fashion, it is, in the interest of clarity,
necessary that the following discussion limit itself to the
broad, widely held convictions of the adherents. This implies
some problems with semantics since most philosophers seem to have
a penchant for coining their own words. Nonetheless, in the
following we will use the terms modernism, positivism, demarca-
tionism, falsif icationism, and logical positivism interchangably
.
Also, it is necessary to recognize at the outset that
modernism, owing to the philosophy of Lakatos, is usually
construed as more than just a "how-to" cookbook intended to aid
the scientist in his search for insight. Modernism is also used
as a measuring rod to evaluate the truth content ( verismilitude)
of theories proposed in the past. Since this paper neither
presents nor tests any novel conjectures, our interest in
modernism stems from its potential use as a measuring rod to
evaluate the verismilitude of the research in agricultural non-
certainty. However, the presentation of modernism in this
chapter focuses primarily on the methodology's "how-to" function
rather than its alternative use as an indicator of scientific
progress.
Also, despite its widespread acceptance today, modernism is
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not a methodology without a rival. From John Stuart Hill to the
Austrian economists of today, an alternative methodology called
verif icationism has repeatedly challenged the precepts of
modernism. Hopefully, our effort to come to know the essence of
"the official rhetoric of economics" can be assisted by a
comparision with the methodology that modernism appears to have
replaced.
With these disclaimers in mind, this chapter will proceed to
present and discuss in reasonably exhaustive fashion the philoso-
phy of science known as modernism. The natural starting point
for any discussion of scientific methodology is the Humean
Problem of Induction (so labelled by Popper) which has historic-
ally served as the starting point for the philosophy of science.
This is because different methodological philosophies usually
part company with Hume's problem of induction. Next, it is also
necessary to consider the metaphysical theory of objective
knowledge which Popper suggests complements (rather than indu-
bitably supports) his idea of falsification. This is included in
the discussion because there are important implications of this
"objective knowledge" for the study of behavior under uncertain-
ty. Finally, the chapter ends with an examination of the ways in
which economics has adopted to ideas of the philosophers of
science
.
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3.2 TWO SOLUTIONS TO THE HUMEAN PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
If there is a common scheme that runs through the rival
interpretations of scientific methodology, it is the general
structure and components of logical argument. In fact, it used
to be said that all truely scientific explanations have a common
logical structure. From Carl Hempel and Peter Oppenheim, we
divide that structure into the following three components. The
first is the universal law. By this we mean some such proposi-
tion as "in all cases where A occurs, event B will occur."
Accompanying the universal law is a statement of relevent
boundary or intitial conditions which constitute the e xplanans
or, as it is sometimes termed, the premises. From the universal
law and the explanans is deduced an explanandum . Consider as a
quick example the universal law: "The sun rises every day."
Given the explanans "today is a new day," then our explanandum .
or prediction, would be that the sun would rise today.
Next, the scientific argument requires what Northrup has
called an "epistemic correlation." The logical structure used
above exists only in the mind. To make these formulations
meaningful, they must be linked with some phenomena in the real
world, e.g. "We saw the sun rise today." As Northrup describes
it (p. 119, 121),
"...these relations are termed 'epistemic;' to distinguish
them from other correlations in scientific or philosophical
knowldege. the adjective 'epistemic' derives from the noun
' epistemology , ' which refers to the science of knowledge.
Thus an epistemic correlation joins a thing known in one way
to what is in some sense the same thing known in a different
way."
"The task of the deductive scientist ...is to begin with the
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postulated entities and relations of his deductively
formulated theory and to find directly inspected data with
which certain of his postulated entities can be
epistemically correlated, so that the existence of the
latter entities can be put to an experimenatal test."
Experimentation is designed to shed light on the truth or
falsity of universal statements. True universal statements are
what the insight-seeking scientist is looking for. Popper's
point is that the truth of universal statement A is not logically
demonstrated by ascertaining through experimention the truth of
deductive consequence B. However, if the existence of B is
experimentally denied, then it can be logically demonstrated that
A could not be the case.
It sounds grand, but there are real problems that lie just
below the skin of this lovely construction. People routinely
believe that the sun will indeed rise tomorrow. "The sun has
always risen in the past," they say, "So I have no doubt that it
will rise tomorrow." The question is, are they j ustified in that
belief? Philosophers have long realized the fallacy of reasoning
from the particular to the general, i.e. Hume's Problem of
Induction. In this case, the universal law infers from a finite
number of sunrises to a greater number of days.
There have been numerous attempts to get around this problem
and explain somehow just how people come to believe what they
believe. These attempts at the solution to the problem of
induction can most relevantly be looked at by considering the
case of human behavior. The economist seeks to gain knowledge
about human behavior by formulating theories. We recognize that
no knowledge will be gained unless at some point in the chain of
48
reasoning, truth is inserted. In other words, where do we put
the epistemie correlation? There are two possiblities . Either
the relation with the real world is made with the universal
statement (apriorism) or with the explanandum . Induction is the
latter process whereby the epistemie correlation is placed at the
end of the chain of reasoning. From this we infer inductively
about the truth or falsity of the universal statement. For
example, the question is which of the following is the proper way
to insert truth into a theory: "All men are rational," which
inserts truth in the universal statement. Or, "The price of
wheat has fallen," which inserts truth at the end of the chain of
reasoning.
In the following two sections, we consider the thought of two
different philsophers who gave two conflicting answers to the
problem of Induction. The first is John Stuart Mill and the
second is Karl Popper. The former wrote on behalf of the method
of verification, and the latter advocated falsification. The
major point of contention between the two skeins of thought is
over the proper place for the epistemie correlation to be
inserted in scientific argument.
3.3 MILL'S METHODOLOGY OF VERIFICATION
Mill believed that the economist should attempt to insert
epistemie correlations in both the universal law and in the
explanandum . But he believed the inductive method to be far less
powerful in truth-inserting power than the apriori approach.
Given his preference, Mill would have never chosen to abandon the
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inductive method as the proper approach to Political Economy,
Mill was convinced that he himself had solved the Humean problf
of induction by the pronouncement of the "ultimate major
premise," a universal law of conservation. Since, he said,
"there are such things in nature as parallel cases; that what
happen once, will, under a sufficient degree of similiarity of
circumstance, happen again" (1884, p. 223), Mill felt confident
in reasoning from the particular to the general.
Also Mill was convinced that human behavior had all the
necessary ingredients for scientific study. "It is the common
notion," he wrote, "That the thoughts, feelings, and actions of
sentient beings are not a subject of science, in the same strict
sense in which this is true of objects of outward nature. This
notion seems to involve a confusion of ideas..." (1884, p. 586).
What Mill argues is that any facts are fit to be the subject of
scientific inquiry provided that they follow one another ac-
cording to constant laws. Even though the study of human
behavior "is the most difficult subject of study on which the
human mind can be engaged" (1884, p. 579), and even though the
fundamental laws of human action have not yet been discovered,
there is no reason to abandon the search.
Moreover, and this seems to be the lynchpin of Mill's
argument, in order for these laws to exist, the same laws of
causality which govern physical behavior must also determine
human behavior. To the modern reader, this sounds like deter-
minism, which it is. What Mill calls the doctrine of Philosophic
Necessity is simply this:
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"That given the motives which are present to an individual's
mind, and given likewise the character and the disposition of
the individual, the manner in which he will act might be
unerringly inferred, that if we knew the person thoroughly,
and knew all the inducements which are eating upon him, we
could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can
predict any physical event" (1884, p. 581-582).
However, for several reasons, Mill opted for a deductive
approach over the inductive. First, "though he was a foremost
advocate for employing the logical methods of the natural
sciences in social inquiry, he was convinced that experimentation
towards the establishment of general laws was not feasible in the
social sciences" CNagel, p. 454). In his Logic , Mill's two main
methods of experimental inquiry, the Method of Agreement and the
Method of Difference, required controlled experiments where one
and only one factor could be varied in two instances of a
particular phenomena. Of course, as Nagel has observed, this
strictly controlled experimentation is rarely possible, even in
the natural sciences (p. 456).
Secondly, Mill recognized that economics is not a self-
sufficient science. By this we mean that an economic explanation
is not possible in terms as exact as the natural sciences. This
is because "we can not foresee the whole of the circumstances in
which those individuals will be placed. But further, in any
given combination of (present) circumstances, no assertion, which
is both precise and universally true can be made with respect to
the way that human beings think, feel, or act" (1884, p. 588).
Hence, the difference between the natural sciences and "moral"
sciences is one of degree not kind. Mill likens the study of
human behavior to the study of the tides. No one doubts that
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tides can be predicted with reasonable accuracy, but there are a
multitude of minor causes (wind, temp, etc.) which conflict with
the major causes of the sun and moon.
In his Political Economy, Mill thought that he had isolated
the major causes of human behavior, but he was cognizant of the
minor forces and so he framed his theory in the form of "tendency
laws" whereby the general direction of change might be predicted.
And the source of these tendency laws, for the reason cited
above, could not be the inductive method of experimentation.
Neither could it be abstract, "geometrical method" where only one
cause could be identified at one time" (1884, p. 615). Mill was
convinced, again, that all human behavior was governed by
psychological and ethological laws and that these laws work
through individuals and not groups.
What Mill settled on was what he called the concrete
deductive method whereby the tendencies would be deduced from a
priori laws of human nature. Positive predictions are therefore
impossible in the case of human behavior owing to the immense
complexity of life. A scientist would have to know absolutely
everything about the a person's habits, personality, and expecta-
tions in order to be able to make predictions. Clearly, in the
case of economics where so many different personalities are
involved, such prediction is impossible. However, Mill didn't
doubt his or anyone else's ability to know apriori the laws of
human nature. What he did doubt was anyone's ability to predict
because such prediction is grounded on some suppositions the
sense of circumstances that exist. Hence the predictions are
hypothetical and yet derived apriori. Therefore, no theory was
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capable of falsification, all theories would be verified if only
we could know the true circumstances under which the individual
operated.
Let us look closely at the notion of apriorism for a moment.
From the Encvlopedia of Philosophy
,
we learn that the distinction
between apriori and a posteriori is an epistemical one, i.e., it
has something to do with knowledge. Apriori means literally
"from what is prior" and aposteriori means "from what is
posterior." The ideas have their source in Aristotelian philo-
sophy. "A is prior to B in knowledge if and only if we can not
know B without knowing A... It follows that to know something from
what is prior is to know what is, in some sense, its cause" (p.
140).
This is where the discussion of apriorism must begin. A
priorism is an epistemological theory of knowledge that like
Popper attempts to confront and defeat the problem of induction.
Contrary to Popper who assumes that knowledge is never certain,
there is one thing that is certain to the apriorist and that is
the logical structure of the human mind. Ludwig Von Mises, a
strong proponent of apriorism, has written "Human knowledge is
conditioned by the structure of the human mind. If it chooses
human action as the subject matter of its inquiries, it can not
mean anything else than the categories of action which are proper
to the human mind and are its projection into the world of
becoming and change" (p. 36) .
Hence, the essence of apriori reasoning is that it aims "at a
knowledge unconditionally valid for all beings endowed with the
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logical structure of the human mind. Its statements and
propostitions are not derived from experience. They are, like
those of logic and mathematics, apriori. They are not subject to
verification or falsification on the grounds of experience and
facts" (Von Mises, p. 32).
It is important to note that the classics never doubted the
essential truth of the intial premises. To them, "introspection
was universally regarded in the past, whatever may be the fashion
today, as an empirical technique of investigation, and sharply
distinguished from intuition or innate ideas" (Jacob Viner, p.
328).
One can readily see how the two concepts of apriorism and a-
posteriorism found ready application in the field of economics.
It seems reasonable that only those creatures with an innate
knowledge of what it is like to be human and who themselves have
to choose, could gain insight from the tenets of economic theory.
There is no need to find quotes from early and even contemporary
writers regarding the importance that being human is to under-
standing economics. The apriorist sees the necessity for the
economist to be truly a rennaisance man. No Martian could ever
be an economist because no Martian could know what human action
is like intuitively. And without intuitive understanding, we are
without knowledge of ultimate causes. The goal of the apriorist
is insight into the workings of human interaction. Insight is a
feeling, it is a thought, it is not modernist objectivity.
It is this insight into the ultimate causes which separates
the social scientist from the natural scientist. The esteemed
natural scientist may have controlled experiments, but they can
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say nothing about such ultimate causes as force and cause. Thus,
despite the complexity of human action, the apriorists felt that
their science could say things which the physical sciences never
could. Not suprisingly, the apriorist concludes that "What a
huge advantage for the natural scientist if the organic and
inorganic world clearly informed him of its laws, and why should
[economists] ignore such assistance?" (Weiser, p. 132).
According to Mises, the central tenet of economics (and the
title of his book) originates from the apriori notion that humans
"act." From here he reasons that they wouldn't act at all if
they were perfectly satisfied. They also wouldn't act unless
they possessed some type of reason which would allow them to
equate means to ends. Also, action implies choice and choice
implies choosing among possible means to achieve given ends.
From this all the textbook dogmas can be quickly deduced.
What the apriorist economist argued was that things in the
economic world are not always as they seem. Prices, markets,
wages, and the rest were not studied disembodied from innate
knoweledge. They knew, as Shackle has said, that the source of
human action is thought. "It is therefore a branch or applica-
tion of epistemics, the theory of thoughts. Economics is
concerned with thought about things, both directly, when busness
men consider the intended uses of their resources, and indirect-
ly, when they consider and conjecture each other's thoughts about
what to do with the resources entrusted to them" (1972, preface).
Since economics, to the apriorist, is a branch of epistemics, and
since epistemics is a branch of metaphysics, the core proposi-
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tions of economics are irrefutable. In other words, the
apriorists inserts truth into the universal statements and then
deduces particular consequences from that.
The specific method of the apriorist was the formulation of
ideal types, e.g. Mill's economic man. In his On Definition of
Political Economy
,
Mill created the famous "economic man" "Which
makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive;
except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing
principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labor,
and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences" (1967,
p. 321).
Surely. Mill's conception of economic man appears rudimentary
to the today's economist after one hundred and fifty years worth
of ref ininement has been added to the concept. Yet an economic
man is just as abstract as Euclidian geometry unless there is
that epistemic correlation with the real world. The classical
writers certainly recognized this. That is why they buttressed
their theories with what has become known as tendency laws. Mill
recognized that man doesn't always behave with cold reason
(especially in the face of uncertainty.) Therefore, he supported
efforts to verify the theory. And if the deductive consequences
of the theory failed to coincide with actual fact, Mill said
that "the discrepancy between our anticipations and the actual
fact if often the only circumstance which would have drawn our
attention to some important disturbing cause which we had
overlooked." (1967, p. 332). The economist errors, he argued,
"when he makes the wrong kind of assertion; he predicted an
actual result, when he should only have predicted a tendency to
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that result — a power acting with a certain intensity in that
direction" (p. 333)
.
Thus, given premises assumed to be true on the basis of
introspection, the economist need only be concerned with deter-
mining "the limits of [the theory's] application" (J.N. Keynes,
p. 17). Hence, we have verif icationism. Verification is
consider a "defensive methodology" because it is difficult to
supplant theories with new ones when the economist is caught
between determining whether the discrepanciy between theory and
the facts is due to "disturbing causes" or whether perhaps the
theory itself is incorrect. Hill writes, "in all cases where the
decutive method is used, it [the qualification ceteris paribus 1
is present more or less," we must not "suppose theories over-
thrown, because instances of their operation are not patent to
observation" (1884, p. 218).
One wonders if Mill and the verif icationists have pulled a
fast one on us. By switching from the inductive to the deductive
via apriorism, has he evaded the Humean problem of induction?
apriorism is after all an epistemological theory of knowledge
that is irrefutable. It posits itself as the one exception to
the problem of induction. Yes, reasoning about the nature of the
human animal when only a finite number of them have been observed
is in violation of Hume's proscription against induction. But at
least in economics, the apriori assumptions of rationality,
choice, and action do seem, well, a priori sensible. Frank
Knight wrote that "we surely know these propositions better than
we know the truth of any statement about any concrete physical
57
fact or event, whether reported by someone else or made by
ourselves on the basis of our own experience, and fully as
certainly as we know the truth of any axiom about mathematics or
logic" (1940, p. 165). Sensible or not, the apriori is strictly
speaking irrefutable. That is probably the primary reason why it
has been replaced in the last 30 years as the "official" rhetoric
of economics.
3.4 POPPER'S SYSTEM OF FALSIFICATION
Like the apriorists, Popper begins his theory of falsi-
fication with a certain metaphysical theory of knowledge. But,
as will be seen, Popper doesn't contend that his falsification
stands or falls on the validity of the metaphysical concept he
calls realism. "Realism [he writes] like anything else outside
logic and finite arithmetic is not demonstrable; but while
empirical scientific theories are refutable, realism is not even
refutable.
. .But it is arguable, and the weight of the arguments
is overwhelmingly in its favour" (1972, p. 38). Popper's point
is that the starting point in the search for justifiable know-
ledge is not decisively important (1972, p. 104). Unlike
Descartes, we needn't go about doubting until we find the
indubitable. Hence, acceptance of the metaphysical notion of
realism is not a necessary prerequisite to justify Popper's
empirical rule of falsif icationism. Popper writes that "I find
it comparatively unimportant whether anybody believes in my
[philosophy]" (p. 25). We can therefore bypass realism until the
next question and move straightaway into the gist of the matter.
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And the gist of the matter is the "problem of induction."
Solve it, and you will have vindicated reason as a meaningful
tool of human understanding.
As was mentioned above, the problem of induction begins with
questions about how people come to believe what they believe,
i.e., it is a question of epistemology . Why do people expect the
sun to rise tomorrow morning? The commonsense answer is that we
believe that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has done so in
the past. But what is the iustif ication
,
the philosophers have
wondered, for the belief that the future will be just like the
past? Or to rephrase the question, what is the justification for
reasoning from the particular to the general. When Hume raised
this question, he believed that it consisted of two separate
problems, one logical and one psychological. According to
Popper, Hume's logical problem is "are we justified in reasoning
from repeated instances of which we have experience to other
instances [conclusions] of which we have no experience?" (1972,
p. 4). Hume's answer was "No." No matter how many repetitions
we observe of a phenomena, there is no justification for
reasoning from the particular to the general.
Hume's psychological problem was, again according to Popper,
"Why nevertheless, do all reasonable people expect, and believe
,
that instances of which they have experience will conform to
those of which they have no experience?" (p. 4). Hume's answer
was that, through repitition, we become conditioned to the facts
of life and thereby believe them. The devestating consequence of
these answers is that we can't tell the difference between
beliefs that are justified and beliefs that are not. The problem
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of induction is then that "our knowledge is unmasked as being not
only of the nature of belief, but of rationally indefensible
belief of an irrational faith" (1972, p. 5).
Popper's first step towards the solution of the problem is to
reformulate the questions above into objective terms. He does
this because "only objective knowledge is criticisable: subjec-
tive knowledge becomes criticizable only when it becomes objec-
tive. And it becomes objective when we say what we think; and
even more so when we write it down, or print it" (p. 25). Hence,
"beliefs" become "statements" and "knowledge" becomes "explana-
tory theories." The next step for Popper was to assert a
principle of transference whereby "What is true in logic is true
in psychology" (p. 6). This meant that if he could explain this
main problem of induction, then this would also show that our
understanding needn't be built on irrational faith.
Popper then reformulated the logical problem in induction
into three separate generalizations: 1) Can the claim that a
theory is true be justified by empirical evidence? Popper,
agreeing with Hume, answers "No." 2) Can the claim that a
theory is false be justified by empirical evidence? Here, Popper
answers "Yes." This is the genesis of falsisif icationism. 3)
"Can a preference, with respect to truth or falsisty, for some
competing universal theories over others ever be justified by
such 'empirical reasons'" (p. 8). Again, Popper answers in the
affirmative by saying that we should embrace those theories which
have so far resisted attempts at falsification.
There are a few important implications to these answers.
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First, since the answer to the first question is negative, we can
never justify truth. Popper's philosophy of science sought to
defeat the notion that deductive reasoning can transmit truth in
two directions. Previous to Popper, the consensus among philo-
sophers of science had been that the distinguishing feature of a
scientific argument was its logical form. This means that all
universal statements must be hypothetical guesses or conjectures.
Of course, the consequences of this are devastating for aprior-
ism. By reformulating the Humean problem of induction into
objective terms, Popper completely cut off any connection between
aprior knowledge and truth.
The second implication follows from the first. It is the
principle of empiricism. "Only experience can help us to make up
our minds about the truth or falsity of factual statements"
( 1 972 , p. 12). Popper doctrine seeks to demarcate science from
all other fields of inquiry. He writes,
"...I still take it to be the first task of the logic of
knowledge to put forward a concept of empirical science , in
order to make linguistic usage, now somewhat uncertain, as
definite as possible, and in order to draw a clear line of
demarcatiion between science and metaphysical ideas... We may
distinguish three requirements which our empirical theoreti-
cal system will have to satisfy. First, it must be syn-
thetic , so that it may represents a non-contradictory, pos-
sible world. Secondly, it must satisfy the criterion of
demarcation, i.e., it must not be metaphysical, but must
represent a world of possible experience . Thirdly, it must
be a system distinguished in some way from other such sys-
tems as the one which represents our world of experience"
(1965, p. 38,39).
Third, the method that is suggested by the reformulated
questions is deductive logic by which the theorist should
endeavor to construct tests for his hypothetical universal
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statements. However, Popper concludes that there is no particu-
lar scientific form that can produce scientific knowledge. The
path to truth is not certain, all that can be accomplished, he
suggests, is that falsity be avoided. Hence, we have "falsifica-
tionism." Thus, the demarcation problem has been made clear:
"But how is the system that represents our world of experience to
be distinguished? The answer is: by the fact that it has been
submitted to tests, and has stood up to tests" (Popper, 1965 p.
39).
Hence, Popper calls for methodological "conventions" by which
theory will seek insight by trying to predict and that the
scientist will test that theory by trying to falsify it. Mark
Blaug in his book on methodology sums the methodological rules of
the falsif icationist. (The references given are from Popper.)
1. ...adopt such rules as will ensure the testability of
scientific statements; which is to say, their
falsifiability [1965, p. 49]
2. ...only such statements may be introduced in science as
are inter-subjectively testable [1965, p. 56]
3. ...in the case of a threat to our system we will not save
it by any kind of conventionalist strategem [1965 p. 82]
[By this he means setting up a theory in such a way that
it is very difficult to falsify.]
4. ...only those [auxiliary hypotheses] are acceptable whose
introduction does not diminish the degree of falsifiabil-
ity or testability of the system in question, but on the
contrary, increases it.
5. Intersubjectively tested experiments are either to be
accepted, or to be rejected in the light of counter-
experiments. The bare appeal to logical derivations to
be discovered in the future can be disregarded. [1965 p.
84]
6. We shall take it [a theory] as falsified only if we
discover a reproducible effect which refutes the theory.
In other words, we only accept the falsification if a
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lower level empical hypothesis which describes such an
effect is proposed and corroborated [1965 p. 86].
7. ...those theories should be given preference which can be
most severly tested [1965 p. 121].
8. ...any new system of hypotheses should yield, or explain
the old corroborated regularities [1965 p. 273]
9. ...auxiliary hypotheses should be used as sparingly as
possible [1965 p. 253]
These rules will be considered in detail as they relate to non-
certainty theory in Chapter IV.
Popper recognizes the fact that once induction is recognized
as non existent, meaning that truth will never be ascertained
with finality, this might discourage some from research. But, he
argues, the theories which the researcher will be most interested
in are those that have so far resisted efforts to falsify them.
His interest stems primarily from the fact that some of them just
might be true. In the case of competing theories (which explain
the same thing) , the doctrine of falsification urges the
researcher to set up "crucial experiments" whereby the contructed
theories might be put to the severist possible test that only one
of the competitors could possibly survive.
As a theory passes successive tests of falsification, it
becomes corroborated to a greater or lesser degree. All theories
should at any time t carry with them "a concise report evaluating
the state of the critical discussion of a theory, with respect to
the way that it solves its problems; its degree of testability,
the severity of the tests it has undergone; and the way it has
stood up to these tests .. .Corroboration is a report of past
performance. .. it is essentially comparative :... one can only say
63
that the theory A has a higher Cor lower) degree of corroboration
than theory B...[the report] says nothing whatever about future
performance or about the reliability of the theory" (p. 18).
These reports are essential to determining whether or not a
theory is being protected by immunizing strategems which minimize
testability. Also, they suggest the necessity for the method-
ological rules presented above.
3.5 THE MODERNIST NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY
Recall Keynes' argument for a distinction between positive
economics, normative economics and the art of economics. It
should be immediately noted that all Keynes met by "positive" was
that the positive economist should "stand nuetral between
competing social schemes. [Theory] furnishes information as to
the probable consequences of given lines of action, but does not
itself pass moral judgements, or pronounce what ought or what
ought not to be" (p. 13). And this determination of "what is" is
precisely what Popper's falsif icationism promises to do.
The desire for a positive economics can be claimed to be
satisfied by Popper's falsification doctrine only because
Popper's metaphysical theory of realism mentioned at the begin-
ning of this chapter provides for an explanation of the
existence of objective knowledge. To the falsif icationist , there
are three distinct worlds of knowledge. Imre Lakatos, a
philosopher whose ideas are used often to justify the positivist
case, describes the theory as follows: (Note that Lakatos uses
the term "demarcation" where we have used the term "falsifica-
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tion.")
"...The 'first world' is the physical world; the 'second
world' is the world of consciousness, of mental states and,
in particular, of beliefs; the 'third world' is the Platonic
world of objective spirit, the world of ideas. The three
worlds interact, but each has considerable autonomy. The
products of knowledge; propositions, theories, systems of
theories, problems, problemshif ts , research programmes live
and grow in the 'third world'. The producers of knowledge
live and work in the first and second worlds.
"...all demarcationists agree on some important points. They
hold that the question of whether a theory is pseudoscienti-
fic or not is a question about the 'third world.' Hence, for
demarcationists, a theory may be psuedo-scientif ic even though
it is eminently 'plausible' and everybody believes in it and
it may be scientifically valuable even if it is unbelievable
and nobody believes in it. A theory may be of supreme scien-
tific value even if no one understands it, let alone believes
it. Thus, the cognitive value of a theory has nothing what-
ever to do with it psychological influence on people's minds.
It matters not whether the theory lures them into intensive
belief and vehement committment, nor whether it induces the
euphoric (second-world) mental states of the human mind,
Belief, committment, understanding are states of the human
mind. They are inhabitants of the 'second world'. But the
objective, scientific value of a theory is a 'third world'
matter. It is independent of the human mind which creates or
understands it" (p. 109).
To the falsif icationist , it matters little where the hypoth-
eses to be tested are to come from. In Lakatos's terminology,
they must spring from the second world into the third. But as
long as the theory survives tests of falsification, it doesn't
matter if the theories were written on tablets at the foot of Mt.
Sinai or whether the concepts they postulate are observable or
not (1884, p. 31).
In contrast to the falsif icationist , the apriorists discussed
above also have their own theory of knowledge. Like the
falsif icationist
, the verif icationists have a particular epistem-
ological theory to back up their approach. Also, like the
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falisif icationist , this theory is metaphysical in nature and is
therefore open to verification or falsification. It is merely
intended to throw light on the method of apriori. In a 1940
article entitled "What is Truth in Economics," Frank Knight
explained the verif icationist ' s theory of knowledge. Like
Lakatos, the verif icationist delimits knowledge into three
different spheres. The first is knowledge of the external world,
"including both the plain man's knowledge of everyday reality and
the physical scientist's knowledge of his primary data of
observation." The second world consists of "the truths of logic
and mathematics." And the third world, the world where economic
problems lie, is the knowledge of human conduct" (p. 155). The
reader will immediately note that the verif icationist has no
world of "objective spirit" of the type spoken of by Lakatos
regarding human behaviour.
The task of the philosopher of science is then to "demarcate"
the realm of knowledge into that which is scientific and that
which is not. Once this demarcation criterion has been estab-
lished, all scientists worthy of the name should seek to formu-
late theories within these bounds. On the one hand, we have the
apriorists who say that the science of human behvior must be
built on certain fundamental principles. On the other hand,
there is the falsif icationist position which says that the
assumptions of theory have no basis in fact apriori. The only
way to approach truth is to build objectively falsifiable
theories.
Fortunately, it is not necessary for us to choose from these
competing methodological schemes. As the second chapter shows,
66
economics has choosen the Popperian route. And this is not
suprising. The power and persuasive of Popper's argument can not
denied. How is it possible to exagerate the fact that knowledge
need not be built on irrational faith? Popper's conception of
truth makes its realization endlessly elusive. Truth is the
limit we hope to ceaselessly approach while we recognize we'll
never get there. It is a concept much like infinity. Truth is a
word that is used to define God. It makes good sense to postu-
late a limit to objective knowledge; the answers to the problem
of induction given in the past are surely unsatisfactory. Mill's
idea that one could predict future behaviour if one could only
know the exact circumstances of the case implies universal
determinism. The implications of that case are too horrible to
even contemplate.
Popper has speculated that the reason why the problem of
induction took so long to solve was because the thinkers were
seeking to justify that which is inherently unjustifiable. The
seeker after truth is left with a clear choice: either all
knowledge is based on irrational faith (because induction is non-
demonstrable) or, all knowledge is of a tentative sort which
coincides to a greater or less degree to the truth. Only time
and repeated efforts at falsification can show how close we have
come to that which is the goal of all science: Knowledge. In
the next chapter, we will use the rules derived here to evaluate
the status of the research in agricultural non-certainty.
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CHAPTER IV.
THE MODERNIST APPROACH TO ECONOMIC NON-CERTAINTY
4.1 WHAT IS A SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAM?
Up to this point the discussion of scientific methodology
has been a bit one-sided. The preceeding two chapters focused
attention on just one half of that philosophy of science which
stands as the source of the accepted methodology of economics.
But it is erroneous to percieve modernism as little more than a
"how-to" model for researchers in economics. On the contrary,
philosophers like Imre Lakatos have also emphasized potential of
the modernist precepts as tools by which previous scientific work
might be evaluated. As Blaug writes "For Lakatos, methodology
as such does not provide scientists with a book of rules for
solving scientific problems; it is concerned with logic of
appraisal, a set of nonmechanical rules for appraising fully
articulated theories" (p. 35). It is this petential of
modernism as an historical evaluation apparatus that we seek to
exploit here.
Lakatos's "set of non-mechanical rules" have been presented
and discussed in the previous chapters. The task at hand is to
fully "articulate" the modernist theory of economic non-certain-
ty. In other words, now that the necessary groundwork has been
laid, we can leave the philosophy of science behind (temporarily)
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and focus on the modernist theory of risk and uncertainty.
The strategy to be used in evaluated the proliferation of
theories that incorporate risk is to attempt to define what
Lakatos has termed a "scientific research program" or SRP. This
chapter seeks to outline the predominant characteristics of the
non-certainty research program (NCRP).
But look first at the defining features of a scientific
research program as defined by Lakatos. An SRP, in Blaug's
words, is a "cluster of more or less interconnected theories"
(1980, p. 36). Hence, it is not necessary to consider risk
theories in a piecemeal fashion. We should identify what those
lines of interconnection are. According to Lakatos, the SRP is
built around a "hard core" which is treated as irrefutable by
"the methodological decision of the protagonists" (1978, II, p.
50). The sacred cows of the program rest here in the hard core.
For instance, an SRP's hard core might hold the methodological
rule that whenever events of type A are to be studied, methodo-
logical procedure C (and never procedure D) will always be
invoked. This is what Lakatos calls the positive and the
negative hueristic. Thus, it is the hard core where all the do's
and don'ts of the research program are stored.
Wrapped around this hard core is what Lakatos has termed the
"protective belt." This belt contains, in Blaug's words, "the
flexible part of the SRP, and it is here that the hard core is
combined with auxiliary assumptions to form the specific specific
testable theories with which the SRP earns its scientific
reputation" (1980, p. 36).
While there is usually very little change over time in a
69
SRP's hard core, the protective belt is constantly changing as
new tests and theorems are devised and executed. As should be
clear from the previous chapters, the method by which SRP's are
appraised is the modernist criteria. For a program to be
"progressive," the adjustments in the auxiliary assumptions which
have resulted from attempts at falsification must predict "some
novel, hitherto unexpected fact" (Lakatos, I, p. 33). Converse-
ly, a SRP is said to be "degenerating" when "adhocery" prevails.
Namely, if the auxiliary assumptions must be adjusted to fit the
data, then the passage of time and the continued efforts at
falsification are whittling away at the theory and it is
"degenerating.
"
The central question then is to determine whether or not the
NCRP is progressing or degenerating. But this question can't
even be addressed until a proper understanding of the SRP is
gained. Research programs don't operate alone and untouched in a
void of theoretical thinking. There is first of all a subject
matter, a raw material, a "phenomena" that the theory seeks to
explain. In this case, the raw material happens to be so vast
that it literally encompasses the full scope and breadth of
economics. If economics is, as so many authors have insisted, a
study of the causes and consequences of human choice, then the
non-certainty research program must be built around a particular
conception of the nature of choice. By investigating the
modernist perception of choice, the essence of the NCRP hard core
can be uncovered.
Secondly, an appreciation of a SRP's significance requires a
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consideration of the competing SRP's which also seek to explain
the same "phenomena." In a manner similiar to the way in which
Newton's theory replaced Kepler's and was itself replaced by
Einstein's, a Popperian score of the hits and misses of the NCRP
(i.e., record of attempts at falsificaiton) is hopelessly
relative unless there is a means of comparision with other
programs which attempt to explain the same thing. Ideally, the
competing SRP's would theorize about exactly the same bundle of
subject matter. But there is often a problem, especially in the
social sciences, with the comparision of research programs that
are not fully commensurable. In Lakatos's scheme, according to
Blaug, "A particular SRP is judged superior to another if it
accounts for all the facts predicted by a rival SRP and, in
addition, makes extra predictions as well, some of which are
empirically confirmed" (1980, p. 37). However, it is often the
case that an SRP will imply more than its rival in one way and
less in another. In such instances, the evaluation of rival
theories can become something like comparing apples and oranges.
Moreover, the very existence in the first place of the non-
certainty research program suggests that economists were, at the
very least, uncomfortable with the theoretical limitations of the
orthodox theory which is based on perfect certainty. But why the
move to non-certainty based research? Had the certainty-based
micro program, to use Lakatos's terminology, begun to "degener-
ate"? Was this because the assumption of perfect certainty was
just too unpalatable for even the sturdiest of the modernists to
stomach?
These are the questions that this chapter seeks to address.
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But the point of the questions is to get to the hard core of the
NCRP, albeit indirectly. As Arrow has argued, there are two
basic sources for a theory of behavior under uncertainty. In the
following two sections the analysis reaches for an understanding
of the NCRP by 1 ) coming to grips with our "subjective sensation
of lack of knowledge about the future" and 2) considering the
non-intuitive sources of the NCRP by confronting "the existence
of economic and other phenomena in human affairs which can only
be explained on the assumption that the actors were adapting to a
situation of uncertainty" (1959, p. 12).
4.2 WHAT IS CHOICE?
To be presented in this section is nothing less than an a
priori conception of choice. By this is meant that the ideas
discussed are assumed as intuitively knowable to human beings;
objective substantiation is not required. With this philosophi-
cal stance, there is no need to worry about whether or not the
concepts discussed are testable by predictive experimentation.
Like the nineteenth century apriorists discussed in Chapter III,
we shall for the moment assume that the essence of choice (which
is to say the essence of all economic behavior) can be understood
by looking within to the intuitive feelings that originate such
behavior rather than looking outside of ourselves to the
objective manifestations of human decision.
From a purely modernist posture, therefore, what follows
should be considered as "non-scientific." Recall that the
essence of falsif icationism is the notion that all hypotheses, a
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priori derived or otherwise, are conjectural. Strictly speaking
now, the modernists should, by their own "official rhetoric,"
have absolutely no desire to build up a theory of behavior under
conditions of risk unless the incumbent theory of decision under
conditions of certainty has begun to degenerate.
While such degeneracy may indeed have been occurring, there
are indications that there is more behind the origination of the
theory of non-certainty than just a professional dissatisfaction
with the predictive power of certainty theory. As Arrow was
quoted above, a primary source for a theory of behavior under
uncertainty is "the subjective sensation of lack of knowledge
about the future." Also, consider the striking similiarity in
the way that the opening pages in NCRP literature typically
begin. Almost always there is an appeal to our aprioriC!)
sensations of uncertainty. For example, John D. Hey in his
Uncertainty in Microeconomics opens his book with a familiar
exhortation about the pervasity of uncertainty.
"Uncertainty is everywhere; it pervades every facet of
life. Uncertainty affects everyone. From the cradle to the
grave, we are all confronted by uncertainty; however hard we
may try to avoid it, the problem of taking decisions in
partial ignorance of their consequences remains ever-present"
(p. 3).
But modernists should have no concern for such "second world"
ideas! If uncertainty is indeed a subjective concept, then the
modernist should deal with it only in its objective, "third
world" manifestations. Apparently they realize this since such
apriorist notions quickly vanish after the first few pages of the
the typical NCRP book or journal article. Still, our intuitive
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notion of choice appears to be the primary source of a theory of
behavior under uncertainty. Yet it is odd that the causes of
this "uncertainty" are hardly ever speculated upon.
Consider as another example the following quote from the
opening pages of Halter and Dean's book on uncertainty, "Decision
making is the central coordinating concept of any organization,
whether it is a family farm business, a giant industrial complex,
or a government agency" (p. 1). Certainly the authors are
correct, but they never tell us why decisions are so important!
Perhaps this is because modernists aren't supposed to speculate
about things so metaphysical; they are supposed to make predic-
tions. Yet these "speculations" are crucial to the task of
uncovering the essence of choice. And uncovering the essence of
choice is crucial to understanding the significance of the "hard
core" of the NCRP.
If we are going to gain an initial understanding of the
essence of choice, it is necessary to move outside the modernist
camp to one writer mentioned earlier, G.L.S. Shackle. Shackle is
often termed a "subjectivist" by the mainstream NCRP. What this
means is that Shackle usually tries to finish up what the NCRP
leaves off in the first few "subjectivist" pages of their
literature. Long after the NCRP has turned to the business of
making economic predictions, Shackle continues to think about the
causes and the meaning of human choice. It is his scheme of
thought that we shall exploit here. In what follows, Shackle and
his thought will be quoted liberally. There are two reasons for
this: 1) Most economists are unfamiliar with his writing, and 2)
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The essence of choice is one topic that is so intuitive, so
apriori. that in the interest of clarity of presentation, its
description is best left in the hands of a man with the literary
acumen of Shackle.
Shackle's 1969 book, Decision Order and Time in Human Affairs
represents what he calls in the preface a "final attempt on my
part to communicate my scheme of thought." Since 1949, Shackle
has been the gadfly of the modernist economic method. His many
books which elucidate and elaborate on his conception of decision
testify that he is a man with a cause. His near anonymity among
members of the NCRP research community shows that he is a man
alone. Shackle's determination (his 1 979 book Imagination and
the Nature of Choice shows that the "final" book has not yet
arrived) and persistence stem from what he sees as self-evident
fundamentals of the human condition.
Shackle's first fundamental is apriorist reasoning. He
writes "I seek to show that the essential nature of choice is
discernable in men's most direct, inescapable and imperious
intuitions" (1979, p. vii). Though Shackle doesn't advertise the
fact that he is an apriorist, his conception of choice defies
that possibility of a predictive approach to the truth. Again
and again, he says that choice is an origin, a beginining, an
uncaused cause. He writes,
"Decision means literally a cut; and this I take to be the
most essential aspect of its meaning in our spontaneous,
intuitive, everyday and almost univeral usage, betraying our
attitude to our life and the human condition and our
apprehension of the essential nature of that life as a
process of creation" (1969, p. 1).
75
His phrase "life as a process of creation" is sufficient
testament to the fact that Shackle's economic man is a "play-
wright of history." The choice that he (and we) are interested
in is one that "makes a difference." And as Shackle writes,
choice of this type requires an explicit recognition of the
nature of our existense.
"At the outset, in contemplating 'choice,' we have to make an
election of policy. We can suppose men to be uninvolved in
the architecture of their own history, save as enforced
dwellers in it. If history was determined in every particu-
lar in its whole stretch of finite to infinite extent, at
some source outside of that history, at some one-for-all
creation, men's thoughts and acts are merely items amongst
those particulars. . .Choice in this deterministic view can be
nothing but the name of an illusion" (1979 p. 6).
Thus we have the first fundamental of choice, and that is
that it must be real. To use Shackle's term, choice must be
"non-illusory." Non-illusory decision requires a conception of
history that is non-determinant.
Shackle's second fundamental of choice strikes at the heart
of the problem of uncertainty. It recognizes the fact that the
human animal lives and acts in the present, the "solitary
moment." Confined by time to the present and facing a future
that is not predetermined, man is inherently confronted by a
state of "unknowledge" about the content of the future. In
short, he faces uncertainty. But Shackle's point is that
decision, as we intuitively perceive it, would not be "decision"
at all if the future was f oreknowable. He writes,
"Decision can only take place when several distinct and
mutually exclusive acts appear to the individual to be
available to him. If, for each available act, he sees one and
ony one outcome, and if also he assumes that an act necessar-
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ily has an outcome, and if further he can order all the
outcomes (one for each act) according to his greater or
lesser desire for each, then we say that his choice amongst
the available acts will not involve decision, but will by
contrast be a mechanical and automatic selection of that act
whose outcome he most desires" (1969 p. 1 ) .
Hence, Shackle's second fundamental of choice is that it is "non-
empty;" its content is created by the existence of uncertainty.
Immediately, then we can see that the notion of decision under
what we would call perfect certainty is not, in this scheme,
decision at all. Choice is not choice without uncertainty.
Shackle's third fundamental of choice is centered around the
notion that the uncertainty which the chooser faces is bounded.
Yes, the future is not foreknowable, but that doesn't make it
random:
"In a cosmos lacking order, that consistency of nature that
we think of as cause and effect, a cosmos in which no act
placed any constraint whatever on the character of the
sequel, choice amongst acts would be pointless" (1969 p. 4).
If the universe is random then not only is choice "pointless,"
but it is powerless as well. Thus, the fact that we do perceive
an order in the cosmos, a rationale for existence, and a
possiblity of purposeful living means that choice is "non-
powerless. "
When a chooser faces a decision under conditions of bounded
uncertainty, he considers a set of mutually exclusive possible
outcomes. But where do these mutually exclusive hypotheses come
from? Are they inputed directly from the events of the past?
No, Shackle argues that the source of the potential actions of
the chooser is the imagination.
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"Choice cannot be made among facts, they have been chosen, or
have chosen themselves. Choice requires rivals . Choice is
choice of a course of action able to be follwed by a desired
sequel in the evolution of history to come... Each [rival
possibility] must aspire to the occupancy of one and the same
stretch of time-to-come, yet all must coexist in the
chooser's choosing thoughts, his present thoughts. Only
thoughts, not facts can possess this double essential
capacity. Choice is necessarily made amongst works of
thought, of imagination. Choice is made among thoughts
originated by the chooser" (1979 p. 12).
So it is the work of "inspiration" that creates the entities from
which the chooser must select. These "imagined, deemed possible"
rivals are what makes choice the creative act that it is. It is
because the rivals need not be grounded in events of the past
that genuine novelty and innovation become possible.
Therefore, it is only when choice is non-illusory, non-empty,
and non-powerless that it can possibly take on the meaning that
we intuitively associate with it. Choice under these conditions
becomes the origin of human action:
"[Choice's] vital nature is committment. Choice is a
resolve, a moral and not merely an intellectual act. Choice
erects a structure of intentions, any abandonment of which
will be hurtful to the chooser in some degree. In the act of
choice, the chooser in some degree stakes his own self-
esteem" (1979 p. 15).
In all of this we recognize that what the chooser is looking for,
the point of the effort of imagination and the strain of
decision, is a good state of mind. It is exclusively through the
process of choice that men can achieve such well-being.
In a very short space, we have attempted to bring out the
essential nature of choice. Though one man's view only,
Shackle's concepts have rarely been challenged on the level which
they are presented here. Certaintly no one doubts the existence
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of genuine uncertainty; though perhaps too few economists have
thought about the causes of this subjective sensation of
unknowledge on which Shackle has built his conception of choice.
For example, note how the following quotation from Hey's
uncertainty book clashes in no way with Shackle's conception of
choice.
"We are concerned with an individual who is confronted with a
set of choices, one, and only one, of which he must eventual-
ly choose; the crucial feature of his choice problem being
that he does not know, in advance of making the choice, what
will be the actual outcome of any particular choice" (p. 38).
Armed with Shackle's analysis, we can fill in the holes of the
Hey interpretation. We know the origin of the choices that the
chooser faces — the imagination. We also know that the source of
his state of unknowledge about future outcomes --the non-
determinacy of the cosmos. And we know why the individual
chooses — to achieve a good state of mind. It is doubtful Hey
himself would quarrel with this interpretation. Thus, the
general scheme of choice as non-illusory, non-empty, and non-
powerless is not a component clinging exclusively to any
particular research program's hard core. Later we shall see just
where and why the NCRP parts company with Shackle; the point here
has been to simply attempt to get a grip on the essence of
choice. Shackle's scheme appears persuasive (and generic) enough
to be accepted for the time being as a building block of non-
certainty theory.
Finally, why was it important to "get a grip on the essence
of choice?" Why come to terms with "our subjective sensation
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of lack of knowledge about the future?" The answer is deceiving-
ly simple. Modernist or not, economists had trouble justifying
to themselves and others the use of the classical notion that men
have perfect foreknowledge about the future. Even if this
assumption is applied for purely operational purposes (i.e.,
making predictions), the whole notion of perfect certainty just
wasn't very persuasive. In Hey's words,
"Consider the original motivation for work in the economics
of uncertainty --that the conventional certainty theory
assumed too much. In particular, objections were voiced
about the amount of information that the individual agent (in
certainty theory) was assumed to have. For example, the
theory of demand assumes that the agent knows the prices of
all goods, and his tastes (both now, and in dynamic theory,
in the future). All modern, liberated economists threw up
their hands at this, and shouted 'No way; the informational
requirements are too great!' and set to work with a will,
producing the 'new' microeconomics" (p. 232).
We conclude, therefore, that despite the modernist notion of
strictly conjectural hypotheses, one of the original sources of
the modernist NCRP is a non-modernist idea! A conclusion such
as this was the aim when the introduction of this paper aspired
to uncover the "real" rhetoric of non-certainty research. Later
sections will seek to uncover more of the real rhetoric of the
NCRP in a similiar fashion.
4.3 NON-INTUITIVE SOURCES OF THE NCRP
Like the previous one, this section seeks to uncover the
economist's originating impulse to build an economics of uncer-
tainty. But the sources of the NCRP presented here, and there
are four general categories to discuss, are unique in that they
can not be intuitively perceived. Like our apriori beliefs, the
objective phenomena of the physical world which can be seen,
heard, felt, and spoken about have also worked to convince
economists that there was a need for a theory of uncertainty.
Economists observed phenomena which could not be explained by
traditional certainty-assuming theory. The first of these
categories is the existence of rule-governed behavior that is
non-optimizing. The second is the existence of economic profit
in the pure sense. The third are the manifestations of a non-
constant marginal utility of money function. And the fourth is
the phenomena of liquidity.
Periodically, economists have recognized particular features
of the economic landscape that simply could not exist in a world
of perfect certainty. For the most part, these phenomena are
easily recognized and may be summarily dealt with. For example,
the existense of gambling and insurance provide facile, objective
testimony to the existence of uncertainty.
But there are more subtle indicators of uncertainty in the
real world. Without doubt, perfectly certain decision-makers
would seek to optimize utility by equating marginal utility with
marginal cost. But there is evidence which suggests that the
decision-maker oftentimes will employ standard pricing rules
which dfl. not approach the MC = MR equality. Robert Heiner, in a
recently published article, argues that people's behavior settles
itself into a behavioral regularity that is not even an approxi-
mation to the optimizing level. Consider the three examples
Heiner gives. The first is the publishing history of books
designed to show people how to win at blackjack in gambling
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casinos. At first, the biggest selling books emphasized complex
card counting techniques. From a statistical perspective, card
counting is definately the "optimizing" way to go. However,
owing to the tremendous difficulty facing the player in executing
the card counting procedures, these books have of late faded from
the best-seller list. Presumably, the sizable economic profits
netted by the casinos during this period indicate that card
counting is to the average player a hard-working way to lose a
lot of money. More recently, the most successful books teach a
more rigidly structured method which, though mathematically
inferior to card counting, is implemented because it is a
strategy within the competence of the player.
Heiner's second example is the recent phenomena of the
Rubic's Cube. There are over 43 trillion different initial
combinations from which the unscrambling process may begin.
Experts at solving the cube do not choose the process which
minimizes the number of moves (even though the "cube races" are
often timed). Rather, the rules established for solving the cube
are largely independent of the initial scrambled position even
though all the information needed to optimize is costless to
observe (all you have to do is look at the cube).
Before proceeding to Heiner's final example, we should note
that the essence of the examples given above is that the
decision-maker consciously restricts the use of information that
is available. In the case of the blackjack books, the decision
maker chooses not to count even though such information would be
useful. In the case of Rubic's cube, the decision-maker attempts
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not to determine which one of the 43 trillion combinations his
version of the cube is. This restriction of information that is
readily available is the first clue that agents are not attempt-
ing to optimize. Heiner now ties this in with the work of
Herbert Simon and the "satisficing" approach which Simon has
devoloped over a number of years. Simon has found that decision-
makers are repeatedly found to "systematically restrict the use
and acqusition of information compared to what is potentially
available" (Heiner, p. 564). Satisficing is a means used by the
agent to achieve a desired state; it is not an attempt by the
agent to optimize.
Perhaps a farm manager could be shown via a computer
simulation of his farm that his current crop plan is non-optimal.
He might reply, "Well, that's the way I've always done it." Even
though farmers seem to be more afflicted by stochastic elements
than others, their behavior in many ways is more structured as a
response to this variability. Agriculture is the definitive
example of enviromental variability; the weather, the insects,
the inelasticity of demand for food, etc. all create a bitterly
hostile enviroment for the traditional, all-knowing economic man.
But farmers aren't optimizers in that most of their behavior
appears to be rule-governed. They plant about the same time
every year. They plant in years where it would probably had been
better if they hadn't even bothered.
Heiner's point is that the economic world is full of examples
of demonstrable non-optimization. And the existence of uncer-
tainty is presumed to be the reason why. Certainty theory
predicts that agents will always use all of the available
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information. Thus, the empirical phenomena which demonstrates
that agents don't always use all the information at their
disposal to optimize is our first objective source of a theory of
uncertainty. Heiner concludes that
"The above examples suggest that allowing flexibility to
react to information or to select actions will not necessari-
ly improve performance if there is uncertainty about how to
use that information or about when to select particular
actions. Thus an agent's overall performance may actually be
improved by restricting flexibility to use information or to
choose particular actions" (p. 564).
Our second objective source of the theories of uncertainty is
a somewhat theoretical one given by Frank Knight in his 1921 book
Risk, Uncertainty . and Profit . Though Knight is most often
mentioned for the distinction he drew between risk and uncertain-
ty (a distinction we shall shortly return to), a more important
argument is the one he makes for the relationship between
uncertainty and profit. In a world of perfect certainty, each
factor of production would know precisely what the value of its
marginal product would be (in the case of stochastic phenomena,
each factor would know the expected MVP). Thus, each factor
would demand payment for the value of services rendered and
consequently, there could be no profit. He writes
"In every [conceivable] case, the necessary and sufficient
condition of a perfect, remainderless distribution of the
product of industry among the agencies causally concerned in
creating it, in addition to perfect competition itself, is
that the change can be anticipated over the period of time to
which producer's calculations relate. Where the results of
the employment of resources can be foreseen, competition will
force every user of any productive resource to pay all that
he can afford to pay, which is its net specific contribution
to the total product of industry" (p. 172).
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Knight's theory is not without its detractors. But his
example illustrates what might be called a second source of
theories of uncertainty. Whereas Heiner's empirical phenomena
centers around the difficulty faced by humans in solving complex
problems, Knight's example is based on the lack of foresight
discussed in the previous section.
A third non-intuitive source of theories of risk and
uncertainty are the objective manifestations of risk preferences.
To be sure, risk preferences are intuitively palatable. But our
concern here is with the objective consequences of such prefer-
ences. Perhaps the oldest example of risk preferences is
Bernouli's 1738 memoir of the St. Petersburg Paradox. (Much of
the following discussion is taken from Blaug's Economic Theory in
Retrospect
, 1978, p. 347,348). The nature of the paradox is this:
A coin is tossed until heads appears, if heads appears on the
first toss, A pays B $1 ; if heads appears for the first time on
the second toss, A pays B $2; if heads appears on the third toss,
A pays B $4, and so on,
n-1
always paying $2 for each nth toss if a head appears. Now
the question is: What fee should B be willing to play for the
privilege of playing the game assuming that the coin tossing
is "fair." A fair game is one in which the player is never
asked to pay more than the total mathematical expectation of
success, that is, the actuarial value of the gamble, at each
stage of the game. The expected gain or loss of income from a
"fair bet," therefore, always equals zero. The mathematical
expectation of success is
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on the first toss; (Prob. of heads)($1) = (.5)($1) = $0.50
on the second toss: (P of heads)(P of heads)($2) = $0.50
n n-1
on the nth toss: (P of heads) x $2 = $0.50
-1
Since the probability of heads is .5 (or 2 ), the mathematical
expectation of success for each toss is always 50 cents. Since
the total expectation E is the sum of the expectations at each
stage of the game, E = $0.50 + $0.50 + $0.50.... The sum of this
infinite series is infinitely large and so B must pay A an
infinite sum of money for the privilege of playing this "fair
game." Since people are clearly not willing to pay an infinitely
large stake for anything, much less for a gamble, the assumption
that people act as if they were maximizing expected income
produces a contradiction.
The important conclusion to be drawn from this presentation
of the St. Petersburg Paradox is that there is no constant
relationship between income and utility. Risk preferences exist
which distort human action away from the maximizing level. This
phenomena has long been recognized by economists. Adam Smith in
his effort to explain relative wage differentials argues from
casual analysis of lotteries and insurance to show that,
according to Blaug, "people tend to overvalue uncertain gains and
to undervalue uncertain losses, that is, he assumes as a matter
of course that people are 'risk-lovers' (1978, p. 49).
As economic theory became increasingly codified into a
comphrehensive allocative system, it became necessary, in order
to demonstrate the notion of "consumer sovereignty" (where what
is demanded the most in society is what gets produced) to assume
that the relationship between utility and income was constant.
Only through a constant MU of income could the price mechanism be
demonstrated to faithfully transmit people's wants and desires to
the production of commodities. Marshall in his Principles
recognized that "a pound's worth of satisfaction to the ordinary
poor man is much more than a pound's worth of satisfaction to the
ordinary rich man" (p. 130). However, Marshall brushes this
objection aside with the words
"On the whole however it happens that by far the greater
number of events with which economics deals, affect in about
equal proportion all the different classes of society; so if
the money measures of happiness caused by two events are
equal, then there is not in general any great difference
between the amounts of happiness in the two cases" (p. 131).
To say that the marginal utilty of money is constant is
equivalent to saying that a person has no risk preferences.
A risk-neutral person is one whose disutility from, say, a 10$
reduction of income would equal the utility of a 10? increase in
income. But as the St. Petersburg paradox illustrates, this is
rarely the case; and there are other examples. Doll and Orazem
list three important manifestations of risk non-neutral behavior
in agriculture.
The first of these is diversification. According to Doll and
Orazem. "diversification means growing two or more products in an
attempt to avoid the yield and price uncertainty of a single
product" (p. 252). Yet there is a cost to diversification; the
decision-maker ordinarily forgoes a certain amount of profit in
order to protect himself from down-side loss potential. That we
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see diversification in agricultural is objective evidence of non-
certainty. Arrow writes,
"In a world of certainty there would never by any reason to
hold more than one kind of asset bringing in constant
returns, in particular no more than one kind of financial
asset. The obvious presence of diversification requires
explanation in terms of any theory of uncertainty" (p. 18).
Secondly, farmers are observed taking out crop, hail and fire
insurance against the possibility of large losses. Though the
insurance premium is a fixed cost that is wasted if the disaster
never materializes, those who take out insurance evidently prefer
a certain small charge (comparatively) and no chance of a
devastating loss to no charge and the small chance of a large
loss.
Third, the existence of futures markets as hedging tools
demonstrates again the risk preferences of farmers. Doll and
Orazem write that "the farmer may remove all or part of the
future uncertainty cloaking an enterprise by signing a contract
with an outside party" (p. 253). But hedging has a cost; farmers
wouldn't pay that cost unless non-neutral risk preferences
existed.
Of the three general categories of objective manifestations
of uncertainty presented thus far, rule governed behavior,
profit, and risk preference, there is a fourth to add. Liquidi-
ty. John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory was the first
economist to explain the existence of liquidity as a response to
uncertainty. In fact, of his four motives to hold cash (income
motive, business motive, precuationary motive, and the specula-
tive motive) the latter two are unexplainable under conditions of
perfect certainty (p. 170).
We can generalize Keynes's thought to non-financial assets as
well. Hart, as cited by Arrow, has argued that capital equipment
designed to provide for an uncertain future tends to have
operating costs that vary as little as possible over a wide range
of output. Arrow comments that "This indeed is part of a general
principle that under uncertainty the optimal policy is not, in
general, the same as the best policy corresponding to [condi-
tions] of perfect certainty" (p. 19). We might consider this
phenomena to be a sort of "liquidity of cost" where the agent
seeks to keep flexibility in production high.
The existence of inventories is perhaps a more obvious form
of liquidity. No one would hold them if they knew for certain
what the future demand would be.
But the Keynsian notion of liquidity has more dramatic
implications than inventories and capital flexibility. In the
Keynsian system, unemployment and depression are themselves
manifestations of uncertainty. Given the volatility of invest-
ment, Keynes showed that unemployment equilibrium is possible.
And to Keynes the volatility of investment would never occurr in
a world populated by Mill's perfectly certain economic man. By
comparing Mill's "economic man" to the Ford Model T automobile,
Shackle colorfully describes what Keynes' interpretation of
uncertainty meant to the economy as a whole.
"Keynsian economics, the economics of unemployment and
depression, found the Model T economic man to be quite
useless. He had to be redesigned with a new high-power but
very erratic and unreliable engine called expectation and a
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new set of brakes called liquidity preference, and a petrol
tank called income with a carburation system called consump-
tion which had a very large leak called saving, which if too
large, slowed the machine down until it could no longer carry
its full load of unemployment, unless expectation could be
tuned up to a very high marginal efficiency of capital"
(1966, p. 124).
Thus what many have called the Keynesian revolution was a
revolution in the first place because of his recognition of the
existence of uncertainty. We shouldn't have to look beyond the
employment and inflation statistics for our non-intuitive
evidence which has prompted economists to build a theory of
uncertainty
.
The four manifestations of uncertainty discussed here are not
autonomous nor is the list complete. This section merely sought
to capture some of the major non-intuitive elements that helped
to originate theories of uncertainty.
4.4 GENERAL STRUCTURE OF DECISION ANALYSIS
Now that the dual justifications for a theory of uncertainty
has been considered, the next step is to discuss the general
structure of the decision process. What follows are the general
characteristics of any theory of decision — even decision under
certainty. Thus, what is presented in this section does not
constitute the "hard core" of the NCRP. This is the "generic"
structure that few disagree with. This section is the final
building block that needs to be set in place before proceeding to
the "hard core" of the NCRP.
It should be said first of all that there is a particular
type of business decision to be focused on here. Section 4-2
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discussed decision in its most general form. The emphasis of
decision theory is on what Margaret Wray has called "the
entreprenuerial decision." We assume that, in her words,
"The entreprenuer has, typically, certain acquired skills
which he uses to form judgements about the credibility of
certain outcomes, when faced with the problem of choosing
between alternative courses of action in the face of
uncertainty. These skills result from the entreprenuer ' s
business experience in the particular sphere of industry or
trade in which his firm operates" (p. 120).
Wray contrasts the entreprenuerial decision with what she
calls the "managerial" decision which are "those made as part of
the routine of any well-established and efficiently run business"
(p. 122). At its core, the entreprenuerial decision is unique.
It is in Shackle's terminology, a non-divisible, non-seriable
trial. By non-seriable, Shackle means "to exclude any act
which. .. lacks all individual importance and is a mere annonymous
item in a long series of trials all made under similiar condi-
tions" (1958, p. 35).
A possible example of a "seriable" decision is the case of
the stock-broker on commision who spends his entire day "cold-
calling" in search of business. The broker doesn't really care
who he sells to; his only concern is that at the end of the month
the bottom line will be satisfactorily profitable. Each indivi-
dual call lacks uniqueness, it is thus a seriable trial. Now
suppose that the broker knows that he on average sells stock to
one out of every 35 people that he talks with and that on average
he talks with seventy people everyday. A divisible decision
would be one where the broker would be asked to predict how many
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sales he would make in a day. Such a predition would be
calculable on the basis of objective probabilities;
[ = (1/35M70) = 2 ], hence we would call it a divisible decision.
This restriction of discussion to non-divisible, non-seriable
decisions means that the only choices that interest us are those
which are "creative, capable of injecting something essentially
new into the stream of events" (Shackle, 1958, p. 108). A good
example of this "entreprenuerial" decision is the "real life" one
that faces the western Kansas farmer who at present is irrigating
his crops. In recent years the farmer has had to pay more for
less water as the Ogalalla Acquifier, at least in this region,
appears to be drying up. Soon it may no longer be feasible to
irrigate and the farmer may have to switch to dryland wheat
farming. But when, if ever, should such a switch be made? A
major decision like this one will require all the expertise that
the farmer can possibly muster. It will be an entreprenuerial
decision at its most extreme. Decisions like these are what
concerns the choice theorists. And the general structure of
decision as it is presented below is intended to model such
choices. According to Cohen and Cyert there are five elements
of the basic decision problem (p. 290). The first of these is
that the individual has a number of possible alternative actions.
Let a* be this vector of all the possible alternatives from which
the decision-maker might choose.
The second element of the decision problem is to whittle down
a* to all those alternatives which are "the behavior alternatives
that the agent actually considers" (p. 290). Let "a" be the
vector of all the admissible alternative actions. Thus, refering
92
to the example above we might have:
a(1) = continue to irrigate
a(2) = stop irrigation and switch to dryland wheat
a(3) = sell the farm
Third, there are a number of possible "states of nature"
which might occur depending on what action is taken. Let the
vector s represent all of the states of nature which the decision
maker thinks to be possible. For example,
s(1) - the water supply dries up
s(2) a the water supply stabilizes
s(3) = the acquifier literally overflows with plenty
of cheap water for everybody
Fourth there is a payoff function which represents in dollars
or utility the "range" of gain or loss which might result from
each possible alternative action. For example,
a(1) = -20. 0% -10. OS 0.0? 10.0% 20.0%
a(2) = -30.0% -20.0% -10.0% 0.0% 10.0%
a(3) = -10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0%
The chart above illustrates the of range of possible changes in
the farmer's net worth in response to each possible alternative
choice and each possible state of nature. If the farmer chooses
to continue irrigating [choice a(1)] then the possible changes in
his net worth (depending on what happens to the acquifier) will
range from a loss of 20% to a gain of 20%. Thus, the consequen-
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ces "c" of any action (in this case, the change in net worth) is
a function of the action taken and the possible states of nature.
Hence,
c = c(a, s)
Fifth, and most importantly, in order to make his decision,
the farmer must attach some sort of weight to the possible states
of nature. If "s" was a single value, then a situation of
certainty would be the case. But since the farmer doesn't know
precisely what will happen to the water level in the acquifier,
he must attach some sort "possibility distribution" to each state
of nature. These weights of the states of nature are then
translated into the payoff function to determine the "posibility
distribution" for each change in net worth. Perhaps the
situation might look like the following.
a(1)s -20. OS -10.0% 0.0? 10.0? 20. 0? net worth
P
!
a(2)= -30. 0? -20.0? -10.0? 0.0? 10.0? net worth
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(3) = 10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0%
net worth
The possibility distribution adds a vertical dimension to the
range of possible outcomes. At this point, the specific
properties and nature of the possibility distribution are
purposely left vague. Of course, there is no reason why the
possibility distribution needs to be discrete; it could just as
easily be continuous. In any case, the essence of the decision
problem is that for each action, the decision-maker faces some
sort of distribution of outcomes that can be translated into
dollar and cents (or utility) terms. It is from these distribu-
tions that he must eventually choose. This general structure of
decision forms the basis of all theories of choice.
4.5 THE HARD CORE OF THE MODERNIST NCRP
The hard core of the modernist NCRP is built around, of
course, the philosophy of Karl Popper and the falsificationists.
Of overriding concern, therefore, in the formation of this hard
core is that the system of decision theory be "operational." By
operational, the modernists mean that theory must make unambigous
predictions that are capable of falsification.
Recall that the hard core of any social research program is
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intended to serve as the backbone to the entire research program.
The assumptions given in a hard core are sacred; they are never
directly tested. The "protective belt" is where a research
program undergoes specific application and testing. Hence, for
our purposes, there is no need to be concerned with the experi-
mental and empirical particulars of the program. The hard core
contains the most general instructions (ala Friedman's filing
system of human behavior) on how research should consider, model,
and predict behavior under conditions of uncertainty.
There are essentially three elements which together compose
the hard core of the modernist NCRP:
1. That people have risk preferences.
2. That these preferences are rational, measurable, and
capable of predicting behavior under risk.
3. That decisions are made under conditions of risk rather
than uncertainty.
Since most of the groundwork for these assumptions has been laid
in previous sections, the following discussion of the three
elements will be fairly brief.
1. Risk preferences. Traditional micro theory, with its
assumption that the utility for money curve is linear, prohibits
the possibility that people have risk preferences. In Section
3.1 the phenomena of the St. Petersburg Paradox was presented to
demonstrate that given two risky choices, each with the same
expected value, the decision-maker will often prefer one alterna-
tive to the other. Traditional micro theory, with its linear
utility curve, would have predicted that a decision maker would
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be indifferent to two choices that both carried the same expected
value. By assuming that the slope of the utility for money curve
is non-constant, the NCRP makes a radical break with neo-
classical micro theory. In fact, if there is one element of this
hard core that separates the NCRP from traditional micro theory,
the postulated existence of risk preference is that element. And
in the modernist vien, the NCRP contends that if people have risk
preferences, then their behavior under conditions of uncertainty
is impossible to predict, and hence theories impossible to
falsify, unless those risk preferences are known.
2. Risk Preferences Made Modernist. In their 1944 book,
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior , von Nuemann and Morgan-
stern developed the necessary theoretical apparatus so that risk
preferences might be elicited from simple gambling games in which
the individual would be asked to choose among several risky
prospects. With three simple and intuitively palatable axioms,
von Nuemann and Morganstern made possible the prediction of
behavior under conditions of risk. The axioms are as follows
(from Anderson e_t a_l.
,
p. 67-68):
a. Ordering and Transtivitv . This axiom states that people
are either indifferent between two risky prospects, or they
prefer one or the other. Thus, if a person prefers risky
prospect A to risky prospect B, and if B is preferred to risky
prospect C, then A is preferrred to C.
b. Continuity This axiom says that if a person prefers A to
B to C, then a probability number P exists which would make him
indifferent between B for certain, and a gamble yielding A with a
probability of P and C with with a probability of (1-P). In
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perhaps clearer form:
continuity implies
indifference
<— between — > P(A) + (1-P)(C)
c. Independence . According to the independence axiom, if a
person prefers A to B, and X is any other risky prospect. Then
in a lottery between A & X and B & X, the first lottery will be
preferred provided that the P(A) = P(B)
.
From these three axioms, what is called Bernouli ' s principle
is deduced. If a person follows all of the above axioms, then a
utility function exists which associates a single real number (a
value of utility) with any risky prospect. From Bernouli's
principle, the following properties exist. First, if risky
action A is preferred to risky action B, then the utility from A
is greater than the utility from B. Secondly, the utility gained
from A is obtained by calculating the expected utility of A in an
identical manner as calculating expected probability of A except
that now all the possible outcomes of A are converted into
utility terms. Third, the scale on which utility is defined is,
like tempurature, arbitrary. Thus, Anderson, et al write,
"There is thus no absolute scale of utility and, tempting as
they may be at times, comparisions of utility values between
individuals are quite meaningless. Similiarly, it makes no
sense to speak of one prospect yielding, e.g., twice as much
utility as another prospect to a person. We can only say
that one prospect exceeds the other in utility" (p. 68).
Thus, the utility function is said to be unique up to a positive
linear transformation.
Assuming that a person follows the foregoing axioms, then a
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utility function which describes the person's risk preferences
can be derived in a variety of ways. The particular methods
available need not detain us here; such empircal methods are
considered to be part of the protective belt and hence are open
to debate. What is not open for discussion is whether or not
people actually do follow the axioms. Like the certainty theory
which the NCRP seeks to replace, the assumption that men are
capable of purely rational behavior under conditions of uncer-
tainty is not challenged.
But reason alone is not enough to satisfy the modernist
demand for theories with predictive power. In addition, it must
be assumed that the individual is a maximizer. Thus, when
calcualating expected utility in a perfectly rational way, the
NCRP assumes that the decision-maker seeks to maximize expected
utility. Whereas the certainty theory assumes that under
conditions of risk that the agent will select that action with
the highest expected value, the NCRP postulates that he will take
that action which carries with it the highest expected utility.
Let us summarize this element of the hard core with a "repeat" of
quote given earlier by John Hey in his Uncertainty in Microecono-
mics
,
"...We start with a set of axioms, which appear attractive in
the light of our intuitive notions of 'rational behavior.'
On the foundation of these axioms we construct our theory, a
theory that will enable us to characterise the behavior of
any individual who obeys the axioms, and, more importantly, a
theory that will then enable us to predict how that indivi-
dual will act in new situations" (p. 26).
3. Risk=Uncertainty . This is the last and most important
assumption of the modernist NCRP. In 1921, Frank Knight made the
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distinction between risk as a quality that was "susceptible of
measurement" and uncertainty which was inherently non-quantifi-
able (p. 19). In other words, risk prevails when probabilities
can be calculated for possible outcomes and uncertainty dominates
when they can not. For several reasons, however, the modernist
NCRP assumes that Knight's distinction between risk and uncer-
tainty is irrelevant.
First, since the primary business of the modernist is the
making of predictions, the hard core of any modernist research
program must contain an apparatus which, given the proper inputs,
will generate unambiguous predictions. Though there are several
extant strategies for decision under uncertainty but none of them
has made much impact because, in Hey's words,
"...the decision procedure [under uncertainty] is not so
simple. Indeed, there is no universally agree 'best'
procedure (nor, because of the nature of the problem, is one
ever likely to be found; perhaps this, more than any other
reason, is why economists have steered clear of its analy-
sis)" (Hey, p. 43).
After walking through the various decision strategies under
conditions of uncertainty and showing how each could lead to
different decisions in the same decision situation, Hey exclaims,
"No wonder economists prefer the world of risk to that of
uncertainty!" (p. 44).
On the other hand, decisions in the world of risk are
relatively simple; all the decision-maker needs to do is to
calculate the expected probability of the possible outcomes and
transform these expected values into expected utilities via his
risk preference function. Such an approach is emminently
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rational and the result is always unambiguous. Given a situation
of risk, the rational thing to do is to maximize expected
utility
.
Additionally, just as the axioms of the von Nuemann-
Morganstern utility theory made complete characterization of a
person's utility function possible, the use of probabilities in
decision making allow for great analyitical dexterity in the
characterization of possible outcomes. Most importantly, the use
of the probability calculus requires that the sum of the
probabilities attached to the outcomes of any one action be
unity. With this axiom, means and variances of the different
distributions can be compared and an optimal strategy may be
selected. Probability is a logical concept that posits a
particular relationship between a proposition and a body of
evidence. With the power to calculate inter-action comparable
expected values, the decision-maker ends up possessing essential-
ly the same power that he had under the old theories of certain-
ty, the power to maximize. And the modernist NCRP assumes that
he does just that.
Given the necessity of a probability calculus, the modernist
NCRP has adopted the stance that the probabilities formed by
decision-makers are not objective; they are personal, subjective
probabilities. The reason for this is two-fold: First, ac-
cording to Anderson e_t al
,
"...Unfortunately, all the physical laws, properties, and
interactions appropriate to defining the occurence of the
states of nature in real world decison problems can never be
known. Thus [the concept of objective probability] must fall
by the wayside in searching for an operational notion for
decision analysis" (p. 4).
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It would simply be impossible for the scientist to calculate all
the probabilities for future events. It is much easier to let
the agent do it instead. Besides, there are some nice ethical
overtones which ensue when the decision-maker himself makes the
probability judgements. For one thing, it keeps the decision in
the hands of the decision-maker. Subjective probability is then
defined as "a personal concept of probability. The degree of
belief that an individual has about a proposition. .. is his
subjective probability for it" (Anderson, et al
.
,
p. 18). In
all, these writers conclude that "Subjective probability is the
only valid concept for decision making, just as decision making
is the only valid concept for probability" (p. 18).
As in the case of the utility functions derived above,
methods have been developed to elicit subjective probability
distributions from decision-makers. Often lottery type question
techniques are employed that can be used to generate either
continous or discrete probability distributions.
This then is the hard core of the modernist non-certainty
research program. Let us sum up the essence of the program by
briefly considering the irrigation problem presented in the last
section. Recall that the farmer needed to respond to the
increasing cost and decreasing availability of water for his
irrigation system. Via the modernist NCRP, the farmer would
first calculate the subjective probabilities in terms of dollar
outcomes for each of the three actions he is considering (wait,
stop irrigating, or sell the farm). Then, with his utility
function, the various dollar outcomes would be converted into
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utility values. From these utility and the associated probabili-
ties, the farmer would choose that action which would maximize
his expected utility. Of course, there is no reason that the
decision made will turn out to be the best. However, it will be
a rational from the perspective of this research program.
Finally, if it strikes the reader as odd to picture the
farmer laying awake at night trying to calculate the slope of his
utility for money function, then the "spirit" of the modernist
NCRP will have been misread. What the modernist method strives
for is not descriptive accuracy, but predictive accuracy. Again,
in Anderson's words,
"We do not wander through life with our minds packed with
numbers that we have identified as degrees of belief or
subjective probabilities, but we certainly make decisions as
if such numbers exist. To make our analysis explicit, we
must determine these numbers. Because they must be formu-
lated or judged, subjective probabilities are also known as
judgemental probabilities" (p. 18).
What it appears that Anderson is trying to say in the above
quotation is that prudence, or judgement, plays a role in
decision making. In the next chapter, we will consider just how
prudent the NCRP is by the standards of the methodology which
gave this research program birth, modernism.
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CHAPTER V.
THE REAL RHETORIC BEHIND THE MODERNIST
NON-CERTAINTY RESEARCH PROGRAM
5.1 A PRESENTATION OF "TEST" RESULTS
If this thesis were of the traditional quantitative sort,
this chapter might be titled as a presentation of "test results."
In an analygous way, this chapter represents a compilation of all
the discussion that has preceeded it. Namely, if we accept the
idea that modernism is indeed the "official" "model" of scienti-
fic research, and if the basic tenets of modernism were accurate-
ly presented in Chapter Two, then this chapter gives the results
of our mental "running" of the modernist model with the hard core
of the NCRP used as input. A successful "run" would be one where
the NCRP could be shown to be conscientiously adhereing to the
methodological rules of modernism. In such a case, the conclu-
sion would be that the "official" rhetoric of the NCRP is the
"real" rhetoric as well. However, if our "run" demonstrates that
the NCRP is inherently incompatible with the modernist tenets,
then we would be forced to conclude that modernism is, despite
its reputation as the "official" rhetoric of economics, not the
"real" rhetoric of the NCRP. In such a case, the search for the
real rhetoric could begin. We might turn the idea of modernism
on itself, rephrase the question, and ask, "Just how well do the
tenets of modernism predict the content of the non-certainty
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research program?"
But as in the natural sciences, any test or run requires a
control group that can be compared with the experimental group.
In this case, the control group is the standard neoclasical
research program. The essential elements of the neoclassical
hard-core, for our purposes, are 1) that people have perfect
certainty about future prices, and 2) that people, because they
are risk-neutral, maximize profit rather than expected utility.
What this chapter argues is that the "run" was not success-
ful, that the NCRP has, in comparision with the certainty
research program, failed the modernist methodological test.
Specifically, in view of the methodological standards of modern-
ism set forth earlier, there simply is no other way to grade the
research in non-certainty than to classify it as a "degenerating"
research program.
Ordinarily, such a claim would require a meticulous review of
the results of the empirical testing which has been done within
the "protective belt" of both of the programs. However, in this
case, the need for such an exhaustive review disappears because
the case to be made against the NCRP is a prima facie one. In
other words, by the very content of its hard core, the NCRP
violates the most essential of the modernist dogmas. Section 5.2
and 5.3 expand on this argument.
Given this, Section 5.4 argues that the "real" rhetoric of
the NCRP is not modernist at all, but rather is a somewhat
twisted version of Mill's verif icationism. Recall that verifica-
tionism is built on apriori reasoning. Thus, it is possible
(where under modernism it is not) to criticise the apriori
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validity of the hard core of the NCRP. Section 4.4 is the vessel
which contains this criticism.
5.2 A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST THE MODERNIST NCRP
Translated directly from its Latin root, the phrase "prima
facie" means "at first sight." By saying that a prima facie case
is to be made against the NCRP, we mean that the ways in which
the NCRP violates the codes of modernism are so obvious, so
flagrant, that there is really little need to push our way into
the protective belt of the program to see if the modernist tenets
are upheld. We can tell that the tenets are ignored "at first
sight."
The discussion in Chapter II mentioned Friedman's filing
system of human behavior. Recall that that filing system is
considered by the modernist method to be mere tautology unless
epistemic correlations can be made with the real world to show
that the filing categories are meaningful. To this end, the
modernists have built up a set of methodological rules which were
designed to maximize the corroboration between theory and the
objective world. Thus, when the argument is made that the NCRP
is degenerating, or, that it fails the modernist test, what we
mean is that, in comparision with the certainty research program,
the objective links between the NCRP and the real world are very
weak. Let us recall those rules given in Chapter III which most
apply to the hard core of a research program:
1
.
The theories which should be given preference are those
which can be most severely tested.
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2. The effects which falsify theories must be reproducible.
3. Any new system of hypotheses must yield the same old
corroborated regularities.
4. Scientific statements must be inter-subjectively
falsifiable.
The following discussion will take in order each of these rules
and compare the performance of the modernist hard core with the
hard core of the certainty research program. Let us recall now
the hard core of the NCRP:
1. That people have risk preferences.
2. That these preferences are rational, measurable, and
capable of predicting behavior under risk.
3. That decisions are made under conditions of risk rather
than uncertainty.
First, which is more severely testable, that people have risk
preferences or that they are risk-neutral? Concurrently, is it
easier to falisfy a theory based on incomplete knowledge or a
theory based on perfect knowledge? Of course, the answer is that
it is always easier to assume for testing purposes that people
don't have risk preferences and that they are perfectly certain
of the outcomes of the decisions that they make. Once we admit
the possibility of risk preference, the need arises for an entire
set of auxiliary hypotheses or premises that detail the way in
which the preferences are to be elicited. And once uncertainty
is postulated, a whole set of axioms must be assumed that
describe a person's behavior under uncertainty. As Popper has
remarked, what we are interested in is the empirical content of a
theory. Those theories should be prefered which prohibit the
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most from happening (1965. p. 121). What the necessary auxiliary
assumptions of the NCRP do is to allow a wider range of corrobor-
ating outcomes than would be allowed by assuming that all people
are risk-neutral and perfectly certain.
For instance, suppose a researcher sought to measure the
impact that a new farm program would have on wheat farmers in
Kansas. If the researcher assumes that people are both risk
neutral and possessors of perfect information, then the behavior
of the entire class of farmers can be predicted on the basis of
objective information about farm conditions. On the other hand,
risk aversion coefficients and subjective probability distribu-
tions must either be elicited or estimated in order to make
falsifiable predictions within the NCRP. In the case where the
predictions made under assumptions of risk are not verified, it
is often unclear whether the theory itself is in error or whether
one or more of the auxiliary hypotheses or premises are in error.
It is a modernist rule that the theories which are most easily
falsifiable are those with the smallest number of auxiliary
hypotheses. Clearly, in comparision with certainty-assuming
theory, the NCRP is plagued with more auxiliary hypotheses and is
therefore less capable of severe testing.
Secondly, are the effects which falsify the theories of a
research program reproducible? In the case of certainty re-
search, the answer is 'yes', and in the case of the NCRP the
answer is 'no'. Because of the fact that we are dealing with
non-divisible, non-seriable decisions, non-certainty research
assumes that economic decisions are unique, that the probability
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distribution that happens once, will never occur in the same form
again. Thus, only if a person could make the same decision under
the same set of circumstances more than once could the falsifying
effect be reproducible.
On the other hand, with certainty research, the falsifying
effect is reproducible because there is no risk preference or
probability distribution that is supposed to change as the
situation changes. In all cases, the individual is just as
certain about the outcome of a choice as he was about the outcome
of a previous choice. Hence, certainty theory produces a
reproducible falsifying effect because all that is required to
falsify the theory repeatedly is repeated demonstrations that the
individual is not acting under risk-neutral or with perfectly
certain knowledge.
Third, does non-certainty research explain all the old
corroborated regularities that have been established with
certainty research? The most obvious of these corroborated
regularities is the law of demand. Under conditions of perfect
certainty (and with the auxiliary assumption that the substitu-
tion effect outweighs the income effect), standard micro theory
predicts that the quantity demanded of a commodity will fall if
the price increases.
But under conditions of uncertainty, it is easy to conceive
of an example that doesn't imply this regularity. When uncer-
tainty exists it is always possible that the prediction of future
prices may be incorrect. And if the prediction of future prices
is incorrect, it is possible that the decision-maker will error
and end up purchasing more of a commodity even if the price has
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increased.
Consider an example about hamburger and its price. Now
hamburger is cheap enough so that we can safely assume that in
the case of certainty theory that the substitution effect would
outweigh the income effect. We could thus unambiguously predict
under certainty theory that more hamburger would be purchased if
the price were to fall. However, no such clear prediction is
possible under uncertainty theory unless we know the probability
distributions of all the economic actors for the future price of
hamburger. It is conceivable that they would purchase less
rather than more on the assumption that the price was going to
continue to fall and that better bargains could be had by eating
hot dogs now and waiting a little longer to buy some hamburger.
The perfectly certain economic man is not plagued by such
indecision nor is he prone to error. Thus, at least in this
example, the law of demand is predicted with fewer restrictive
assumptions (or. immunizing strategems) under certainty theory
than under the NCRP.
Fourth and finally, the modernist methodological rules
require that theories be inter-subjectively testable. It is this
rule which, as long as the NCRP adheres to the notion of
subjective probability and subjective risk preferences, makes the
strongest prima facie case against the non-certainty research
program. Recall that the essential core of Popper's system of
falsification rests on objectivity, not subjectivity. In his
Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper's solution to the Humean
Problem of Induction is wholly founded on his transference of the
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problem from a subjective one to an objective one. He writes
that "Now I hold that scientific theories are never fully
justifiable or verifiable, but that they are nevertheless
testable. I shall therefore say that the objectivity of
scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-
sub iectivelv-tested " (p. 44).
Let us make certain what Popper means by "inter-subjective"
testability. Popper gives the example of the chemist who claims
to have made a discovery in his own laboratory at home. If for
some reason the chemist is the only one who can make the effect
happen, then Popper argues that a scientific discovery has not
been made. Only when another chemist produces the same effect
can something objective (and hence scientific) be said about the
effect because two subjects have at once witnessed it (1965, p.
45).
A more dramatic example is the one that Popper quotes from
Winston Churchill's autobiography. Popper praises the following
as "the philosophically soundest and most ingenious argument
against subjectivist epistemology that I know" (1972, p. 43):
"...here is this great sun standing apparently on no better
foundation than our physical senses. But happily there is a
method, apart altogether from our physical senses, of testing
the reality of the sun.. [When astronomers predict an e-
clipse], we have got independent testimony to the reality of
the sun. When my metaphysical friends tell me that the data
on which the astronomers made their calculations were
necessarily obtained originally through evidence of their
senses, I say 'No.' They might, in theory at any rate, be
obtained by automatic calculating machines set in motion by
the light falling upon them without admixture of the human
senses at any stage" (1947, P- 115).
Churchill's example is similiar in many ways to the examples
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given in sucn methodology texts as Friedman's "The Methodology of
Positive Economies." In the same way that a calculating machine
could conceivably predict an eclipse, so could a calculating
machine verify that "the expert billiard player was calculating
the angles of all of his shots" or that "the leaf positions
itself in order to maximize the amount of sunlight it receives."
Such calculation machines create the possibility of an inter-
subjectively testable falsifying test. If the machine revealed
that the leaf was not positioning itself in such a way that would
maximize its reception of sunlight or if the machine revealed
that the pool player was not making shots on the basis of the
laws of geometry, then both theories would be inter-subjectively
falsified.
Of course, Churchill's calculating machine is not necessary
to meet the modernist requirement of inter-subjective testabili-
ty. The point is that more than one of us should be able to
observe the deductive consequences of a theory. But Churchill's
calculating machine does make the problem rather clear-cut; for
instance, could a calculating machine record the objective
behavior of people under conditions of perfect certainty? Yes.
Since certainty theory assumes that all actors are perfectly
certain, there is no reason to treat choice as an individual
matter. Our calculating machine could then record the phenomena
of people engaging in voluntary exchange. In other words, the
machine could observe the easily recognized characteristics of
market activity, prices and quantities. Hence, the machine could
inter-subjectively verify whether or not the economic laws of the
market place were in fact laws at all.
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Likewise, in the case of decision under objective probabili-
ty, where the decision-maker is assumed to be risk neutral, the
calculating machine could easily observe whether or not the agent
obeyed the axioms of probability theory.
But, once risk preferences are allowed and subjective
probability distributions admitted into the theory, the task of
inter-subjective falsification becomes immensely more difficult.
The real problem lies in the conversion of a subjective thing,
degrees of belief about the likelihood of various possible
outcomes, into an objective thing, probability distributions. At
several points in this translation from the subjective to the
objective, there is room for error.
Recall that the method used to derive the probability
distributions is based on simple gambling games of chance. The
risk preferences that are supposed to be elicited are the ones
which apply to decisions that the agent makes in the real world.
But since the gambling games are hypothetical, "There must always
be some doubt as to how well a subject can succeed in answering
hypothetical questions as if they were real-life actualities"
(Dillon, p. 53). Also, perhaps some people have a psychic bias
for certain probabilities. Or, how is it possible to separate
the "love of gambling" from true risk preferences?
Such as these are some of the problems involved with the
translation of the subjective to the objective. Hence, it is not
suprising that writers have urged that,
"interviewers need to be sympathetic to a slow respondent or
to one experiencing difficulty. A few felpful words to make
a hypothetical situation more subjectively realistic are
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often useful. However, an interviewer must take care not to
intrude his own preference into the questioning" (Anderson
e_i aj^, p. 69).
But there is a great problem which emerges when the inter-
viewer needs to assist the subject in objectively forming his
risk preferences and subjective probabilities. In a very real
sense, the interviewer becomes the "co-creator" of the prefer-
ences and probabilities with the agent. It is thus entirely
possible that two different interviewers will derive two differ-
ent sets of probabilities and preferences from the same agent.
Anderson writes "As for any subjective probability, different
judgements will be made by different analysts. It is an
empirical question whether such differences (which tend to be
small) also result in different decisions" (p. 43).
But back to Churchill's calculation machine. Such a machine
would be incapable of subjectively sensing the difficulty that a
subject might be having in answering the questions. And even if
it could be programmed to detect some of the distortions involved
in the translation from the subjective to the objective, the
personality of the man who originally programmed the machine
would be indelibly stamped on the preferences and probabilities
that were derived. What is required to meet the modernist
criteria of inter-subjective testability is therefore that the
same agent be quized by a number of different interviewers to
insure that the results are consistent. However, even with
multiple interviewers (assuming that the subject's patience holds
out), there is the persistent danger of what Learner has been
termed "adhocery." By adhocery is meant the fitting of a
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particular set of data (in this case, answers to questions) to a
particular model. With a few questions and some probability
paper, a subjective probability distribution can be estimated for
just about anything. The point of the inter-subjective testabil-
ity requirement is, as Popper points out, to test that distribu-
tion:
"I mean that observations, and even more so observation
statements and statements of experimental results, are always
interpretations of the facts observed; that they are inter-
pretations in the light of theories . This is one of the main
reasons why it is always deceptively easy to find verifica-
tions of a theory, and why we have to adopt a highly critical
attitude toward our theories if we do not wish to argue in
circles: the attitude of trying to refute them" (1972, p.
107, note).
Thus, the conclusion to this rather long discusion on
testability is that, yes, it is possible to create an experimen-
tal design whereby a person's subjective probabilities and risk
preferences might be observed in a manner which minimizes the
distortion inherent in the translation process. The key,
however, to inter-subjective testability is whether or not the
predictions of behavior made by the caluculation machine or by
the army of interviewers actually are verified by the subject's
behavior. However, there is no doubt that certainty theory is
far more easily testable than the theory which assumes that
people have risk preferences and that they construct probability
distributions to aid in their decision process.
So, in sum, how does the empirical content of the NCRP stack
up against the content of the certainty research program? What
this section endeavored to show was that on four crucial counts
1) severity of possible tests, 2) reproducibility of falsifying
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cases, 3) explanation of the old corroborated regularities, and
4) susceptibility to inter-subjective testing, the certainty
research program clearly dominated the NCRP in terms of empirical
content. But what this section presented was merely a prima
facie case against the NCRP. If it would turn out that, despite
its limitations, the NCRP had stood up better to tests of
falsification than the certainty program, the conclusion reached
here would need to be revised. Hence, what is now required is an
epistemological review of the NCRP. Just how hard have the
researchers in the NCRP worked to attempt to refute their theory?
And how successful have they been? These two questions are,
finally, the ones which will determine how much scientific
knowledge is actually contained within the non-certainty research
program.
5.3 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE NCRP
The last section attempted to ascertain the empirical
content of the NCRP by comparing it with the empirical content
of the neo-classical research program. An understanding of the
empirical content of a set of theories is important because it
gives us a prima facie indication of the degree of
falsifiability of a research program. Comparing the empirical
content of two different theories is a lot like comparing the
water-holding capacity of two different sized glasses. The
analysis of the previous section concluded that the cup labeled
certainty research is capable of holding more liquid than the cup
labeled non-certainty research.
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Now that the size of the cups has been defined, this section
seeks to ascertain just how full they really are. And the liquid
which modernists are interested in pouring in each cup is
knowledge, scientific knowledge. Recall that what knowledge is
supposed to serve as is a tentative representative of the truth.
Truth is, after all, that golden ring towards which men constant-
ly reach. Thus, we should seek to push our knowledge closer and
closer to the truth. The modernists have given us methodological
rules which provide the hueristic, or "how to" assistance that
they claim will push our knowledge of economic behavior closer to
the truth. If our theories possess at least some empirical
content, and if they pass the crucial falsifying test, then those
theories can be said to be corroborated. Thus, the theories
which we build become vessels of knowledge.
The central question of this section might now be asked:
Just how much scientific knowledge does the modernist NCRP
contain? The only way to answer this question is to answer
another question first: "Has the modernist NCRP been put to the
falsifying test?" The answer, which will be defended throughout
the course of this section, is "No." The modernist NCRP has not
been put to the test; it is a vessel, but by the present nature
of its construction, it is a cup incapable of holding knowledge.
Two facts about the NCRP lead us to this conclusion. The
first is that the program has avoided the falsifying test by
opting for a normative approach. Thus, where it might be
possible to refute the theory if agents where to behave in a way
that made it apparent that they were not maximizng expected
117
utility, the NCRP argues that whether or not the agent behaves in
this way is immaterial, but the fact is that they "should" behave
in this way. From their preface of their book Agricultural
Decision Analavsis . Anderson si. al write,
"The approach to risky choice that we follow is a condition-
ally normative and logical one... Given the decision maker's
goal, the approach indicates which alternative he ought to
take... [The steps of the decision theory] amount to no more
than the processes followed by managers in making risky
choices, processes that are usually attempted in intuitive
fashion. However, many risky decisions are too complex and
important to be handled satisfactorily by intuition. Deci-
sion analysis, by its formal procedure, enables a manager to
better insure that his risky choices are in line with his
preferences and beliefs and that full value is extracted from
the information that is available to him" (p. ix, 12).
Why has the NCRP opted for the normative approach over the
positive, falsifying one? There seem to be two answers to this
question. First, the normative approach was chosen because the
amount of knowledge that could be gained by testing a few
people's response to risk is very small. Not much can be learned
by studying an almost infinitesimal fraction of all the decisions
that are made daily. If one person turns out to be a utility
non-maximizer , then all we know about is that one person, and
that particular decision.
It is important to recognize that certainty theory doesn't
suffer from this same drawback. When people have identical risk
preferences and are perfectly certain, there is no need to study
the economy by studying one individual at a time. And since the
assumptions of perfect certainty lead to many of our theories of
the market, economists can learn a great deal by dealing with
entire markets at once.
The second reason given for the normative approach is that
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the axioms of von Nueraann-Morganstern utility theory (Ordering,
Transitivity, and Independence) are so intuitive as to defy the
need for testing. Again from Anderson, si. al
.
"...We emphasize the remarkable nature of the expected
utility theorem. It says first that if a person accepts the
perfectly reasonable axioms..., this nececessarily implies
the existence of both a utility function that reflects his
preferences. . .and a subjective probability distribution.
Second, it says that he should choose between risky prospects
to maximimize expected utility. If you accept the axioms,
you must also logically accept the criterion of maximizing
expected utility" (p. 69).
The most important implication that follows from this
personal, normative approach is that economics is transformed
from an objective science to a moral science. Our intuitive
beliefs about whether or not people follow the expected utility
axioms are just that, beliefs. Without a means to verify those
beliefs, the potential for scientific knowledge vanishes.
Suddenly economics becomes the study not of the actual, but the
ideal. Subjective probability forces us to take a bold leap from
the objective third world, to the subjective second world of
beliefs and opinion. And scientific knowledge is decidedly not a
part of this second world. Scientific knowledge can only exist
in a world where these conjectures about future events may be
criticized and tested. When the interviewers take to the streets
to determine people's probability distributions, what they gather
has no potential whatever for scientific knowledge unless the
predictions generated from the von Nuemann-Morganstern axioms are
allowed to be capable of falsification.
This fact leads a to a curious conclusion: The very method
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which has given it birth, modernism, by its own standards, must
condemn the NCRP on the grounds that it's current contribution to
man's stock of objective knowledge is not likely to be great.
The use of the normative approach on the grounds that the von
Nuemann-Morganstern axioms are apriori valid is about the least
most critical way of examining the truth-content of a theory.
Finally, let us consider a possible objection that the reader
might make to what has been presented here. One might argue that
any appraisal of the epistemic status of a group of theories is
impossible unless actual test results are given which show that
either the falsification attempts have not been made, or that the
theory has failed to predict behavior. And this is a valid
objection. If studies exist whereby 1) risk preferences are
estimated, 2) subjective probability distributions for all
relevant states of nature are estimated, 3) decisions are
predicted, and 4) those predictions are compared with the actual
decision made by the subject in a real world "entreprenuerial"
situation, then the strength of the arguments in this section
will have been diminished. However, in order to make this
knowldege useful for general economic research, it would also be
necessary to show that one decision maker's preferences and
subjective knowledge can be representative for a whole group of
agents in similiar circumstances. Additionally, it would be
required that the empirical study show that these preferences
remain consistent over time. At this time, no studies have been
found by the present writer which contain each of these crucial
elements
.
Thus, it is only with these rather demanding provisos that
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the NCRP can be shown to have filled its theories with objective
knowledge. But the trend in research appears to be moving away
from such descriptive (positive) accuracy, and more towards the
normative approach as typified by the Anderson quotations given
above (see Dreze, p. 11). But this can only be a tentative
conclusion
.
Nevertheless, the implications of this tentative conclusion
are profound. Most importantly, it appears that the methodology
of modernism, though it may once have been, is no longer the
official rhetoric of the NCRP. And thus, the search for that
official rhetoric can begin.
5.4 THE NCRP'S REAL RHETORIC: DEFINED AND CRITICIZED
The discusion to this point appears to have lead to a cross-
roads. If the art of rhetoric is the art of probing what makes a
strong argument, then by modernist standards, the NCRP makes a
weak scientific argument indeed. In fact, modernism seems to be
pointing the research in decision-making in a perverse direction.
We start out wanting to gain knowledge about the way people make
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, and we end up being
sent right back to assuming that men make decisions under perfect
certainty. One of these two opposing forces --modernism and the
NCRP— has got to give.
In fact, Karl Popper, the modernist founder, has written of
the notion of subjective probability that "this theory is
incredibly naive" (1972, p. 79), and later, he says that "This
subjective interpretation of the probability calculus I have
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combatted for thirty-three years" (p. 141).
That the research in risk and uncertainty continues to expand
into new fields, and to convert new followers, should be evidence
enough that the criteria for a strong argument in the NCRP are
not the modernist dogmas. This realization that a whole research
program is proceeding merrily on its way oblivious to the
condemnation it deserves from the modernist viewpoint, immediate-
ly suggests the most important question this thesis could ask:
"Just what is the real rhetoric behind the research in agricul-
tural non-certainty."
Suprisingly, the above is a question that doesn't get asked
very often. The allegiance to modernism has served as sort of an
insulator that has protected the economics of uncertainty from
the hard question of rhetoric. Adherence to Popper's three
worlds of knowledge created a situation where the plausibilily of
the basic assumptions of a theory could not be questioned. Since
these hypothesis were assumed to be conjectural, predictions were
all that mattered. But we have shown that, at least in non-
certainty research, that these falsifying predictions are
extremely difficult to generate.
Once non-certainty research is loosed from the burden of the
modernist dogmas, a whole new range of argumentative possiblities
come into view. A theory can be critcized from top to bottom
without reference to falsifying tests. No longer must the theory
be "operational" in the sense that it generate predictive
results. Let us therefore release the hard core of the NCRP from
the authority which the modernists dogmas gave it and consider
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the value of the research program in relation to the source ideas
which gave it birth: How well does NCRP explain our subjective
feelings about what choice really is? Can the NCRP explain the
existence of profit, liquidity, depression, and rule governed
behavior? These are the questions which the following will seek
to address.
Getting a grip on the "real" rhetoric behind the NCRP is not
a difficult task. First of all, as a sort of graceful nod to
modernism, it is held that any "persuasive" theory of uncertainty
must be "operational," that is, it must make unambigous predic-
tions. Secondly, "persuasive" NCRP decision theory always
assumes that the individual adheres to the von Nuemann-Morgan-
stern axioms. This is a convenient assumption since it is only
by accepting these axioms that an "operational" theory is
possible. Anderson e_£ al
.
write that "if you accept the axioms,
you must also logically accept the criterion of maximizing
expected utility. Moreover, the theorem implies a unified theory
of utility (preference) and subjective probability (degree of
belief)" (p. 69).
We can see that the "real" rhetoric of the NCRP is apriori
based! There should be no doubt that truth is being inserted
into this theory (the epistemic correlation) via the assumptions.
It is Mill's verif icationism all over again, but this time with a
couple of twists. The first twist is, of course, that Mill never
would have assumed that we could gather enough information about
a person to predict his behavior. The second twist is that, in
reality, the economic agent is facing conditions of perfect
certainty. Mill made things much more clear, his economic man
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was unabashedly certain. But with the NCRP, a little bit of
digging is required to uncover the perfectly certain man beneath
the non-certain exterior.
There are essentially three separate arguments which have
been made to show that the NCRP's economic man is just as all-
knowing as Mill's man. The first argument applies to the axioms
and the last two apply to the notion of subjective probability.
Essentially, what the basic axioms of the von Nuemann-
Morganstern theory assume is that the individual can order his
preferences and that these preferences are consistent. These
requirements are routinely considered to be fairly easy to
swallow, until we realize that the axioms are also assumed to
apply to commodities which the agent has little or no experience
with. It assumed that the agent is capable of attaching a
utility value to a commodity that he has never purchased.
Jacques Dreze, the originator of this argument, writes that,
"...a consistent decision-maker is assumed always to be able
to compare (transitively) the attractiveness of acts, or
hypothetical acts and of consequences as well as the
likelihood of events. These requirements are minimal, in the
sense that no consistency of behavior may be expected if any
one of them is violated; but they are very strong, in the
sense that all kinds of comparisons are assumed possible,
many of which may be quite remote from the range of experi-
ence of the decision-maker" (p. 11).
Only a perfectly omniscient decision-maker can see what he has
not seen, and know what he does not yet know. But these axioms
require that he be able to do these things.
Subjective probability distributions are also something that
the decision-maker allegedly forms. The essential character of
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the distribution is that it follows the laws of objective
probability. Most importantly, the sum of all the probabilities
for any possible act is always one. Hence, perfect certainty
about the outcome of a decision would assign that outcome a
probability of 1. Hence, this is why Shackle has termed the
probability calculus a distributional uncertainty variable. As
more possible outcomes are imagined for a given action, the
number one gets split up like a pie, and a little piece of
certainty is handed to each one of these hypothesis. Thus, the
probability of a certain event happening is really determined by
the power of the decision-maker's imagination; the more possible
outcomes he can think of, the lower must be the probability of
each of the other possible outcomes (see Shackle, 1969, p. 18).
Additionally the distributional uncertainty variable requires
(again taking the argument from Shackle 1969, p. 110) that the
list of the possible outcomes be specific and complete. What the
decision-maker must do is imagine a complete set of all the
possible things that could happen, assign each of the possibil-
ites a probability, and juggle them around to make sure that the
probabilities sum to unity.
In this scheme, the probabilities work as a team; mixing
together in such a way so as to yield the perfectly certain sum
of 1. But sooner or later, the time will come that the decision
maker will no longer be able to put off his decision until he has
imagined all of the possible states of the world. Realizing that
he could go on forever imagining what might come, the subject is
forced to make one last hypothesis that means "some other
possibility that I haven't yet imagined." Shackle calls this
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last hypothesis a "black box" (p. 110) because the decision maker
has no idea of its content. But by the rule of the distribution-
al probability, he must assign a probability to that empty box.
He must predict the probability of something happening that he
can't even imagine!
Perhaps, therefore, we should argue that the economic man of
the NCRP is even more omniscient than Mill's economic man.
Mill's man only needed to know what will happen. But the NCRP's
economic man needs to know everything that could possibly happen !
Another argument, this one advanced by Popper, speaks of the
possibility that anyone could really be certain about anything.
He gives the following example: Suppose that your hand is in
your pocket and someone asks you how "certain" you were that
there were five fingers attached to your hand. Assuming that
yours is a normal hand, and assuming you choose to form a
subjective probability distribution about the question, you would
probably assign the probability of one to indicate your perfect
certainty that your hand is full of five fingers. Now suppose
that, paraphrasing Popper, "that the life of your best friend
should depend on the truth of the proposition. You might (and
you probably should) take your hand out of your pocket to make
doubly sure that you hadn't lost one of you fingers miraculously"
(1972, p. 110).
Popper's point is that there can be no such thing as perfect
certainty, even in our subjective beliefs. Certainty, he argues,
is a relative thing which depends on experience and the serious-
ness of the problem situation.
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If a distributional uncertainty variable really implies
certainty, as the above arguments suggest, can we still come to
terms with the phenomena that suggested the need for an uncer-
tainty of economics in the first place? Have we made any
improvement over the old all-knowing economic man? In the
conclusion to his book on the economics of uncertainty, John Hey
asks this same question,
"But what does the agent need to know in the new uncertainty
theories?: the probability distribution of the prices of all
relevant goods, the probability distribution of his income,
and the probability distribution of his tastes (both now, and
in the yet-to-come integrated dynamic theory, in the future).
Is this an improvement?
"Consider also the optimization problems that economic agents
are supposed to be solving. Most of these problems are so
complicated that the economic theorist who publishes the
model has probably spent several months finding the solution
...These optimization problems are so complicated
that the "as if" methodology is stretched to the breaking
point. Are we seriously suggesting that we are modeling
economic behavior? Have we not gone wrong somewhere? (p.
232).
As Heiner has observed, the method of the NCRP has been to
consistently upgrade the capabilities of the decision agent (p.
563) to the point where we are forced to conclude that in fact
this agent faces no uncertainty at all. But despite all of this,
can the NCRP better our understanding of things which prompted us
to invent uncertainty theory in the first place?
What about our subjective sensation of choice? In the last
chapter, we termed choice a creative act whereby the individual
uses prudence to make a decision for which he is not sure of the
final outcome. Historically, prudence was called the highest
virtue and a rare gift because making decisions is such a
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difficult task. But the NCRP doesn't associate decision making
with virtue, rather, good decisions are supposed to come to those
who are the best calculators of expected values. Suddenly the
art of decision decision doesn't seem to mean as much as it once
did before the intrusion of the distributional uncertainty
variable. Suddenly decision is no longer the injection of
something novel into the course of history, but instead, it is a
"best bet."
Additionally, the NCRP carries with it the assumption that
the decision-maker is an optimizer. How does this jibe with the
instances of rule-governed behavior? Recall the black-jack and
the rubic's example's given earlier. No doubt the NCRP's
economic man would be a card-counter since that is the best way
to maximize expected value. No doubt this decision-maker would
be able to determine which one of the 43 trillion possible
combinations of the rubic cube his particular version was. After
all, if he would "prefer" to solve it in fewest possible moves,
then he must certainly have the capability to do so.
Finally, what about profit, liquidity, unemployment, and
depression? Would the maximizer of expected utility living in a
world with other maximizer' s ever encounter these phenomena? It
appears that a world populated by these maximizer' s would
experience these real world occurrences because of one last quirk
in the NCRP's decision theory that has yet to be mentioned.
Specifically, even though we have shown that the requirements set
up by the theory essentially mean that the decision-maker really
possesses the power of perfect certainty, there is no guarantee
under the NCRP that he will actually make the right decision. He
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could guess wrong. Mistakes are possible. He needs to have no
objective justification for the beliefs that he holds; the only
requirement is that his preferences be consistent. But this
leads us to a paradox from which I fear there is no escape; how
could a man powerful enough to divide up certainty into all of
the component possibilities ever error?
5.5 CONCLUSION
In sum, it appears that the non-certainty research program
has caught itself in an intractable dilemma. On one hand,
despite the fact that the program strives after predictions of
human behavior, the empirical content of the program is very
small. This has forced most economists to take the normative
approach to non-certainty decision analysis. The problem with
the normative approach is that it virtually precludes efforts at
falsification. Without efforts to falsify, there can be no
approach to the truth. Hence, by the rules of modernism, the
theory holds precious little truth.
On the other hand, when we consider the real rhetoric of the
program, we find that it is not persuasive at all. Our critique
of the assumptions which was made possible by the removal of the
modernist mask of the program, revealed that uncertainty doesn't
exist, that essentially the decision-maker is assumed omnipotent
enough to estimate all the possible states of the world. He is,
when he has assigned the probability of one to a particular
outcome, absolutely, positively certain that that outcome will
occurr. Yet, despite these godly traits, this decision-maker is
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prone to error and to make mistakes. It is an interesting
combination indeed, but it is hardly a persuasive one.
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CHAPTER VI.
CONCLUSION
What this concluding chapter seeks to accomplish is more than
a presentation of a mere abstract of the thesis given in the past
few pages. Hopefully, from what has been said before, the most
immediate implications of this study will already have been
justified. Rather, let us look at the conclusions reached from
our examination of the rhetoric of non-certainty theory to see if
some more far-reaching consequences can be drawn.
If there is one central conclusion that this paper has sought
to justify, it is that what has really destroyed the persuasive-
ness of the non-certainty research program is their adherence to
an "official" rhetoric or methodology. It is not so important
that the "official" methodology in this case happened to be
Popperian; the important thing is that when an official rhetoric
exists, there is little incentive to test the persuasiveness of
scientific argument.
In the case of non-certainty research, the consequences of
this adherence to an official rhetoric were profound. Namely,
the modernist insistence that theories be "operational" (or,
capable of making predictions) essentially implied that the
powers of the economic man be even more omniscient than the
powers of the old Millian economic man which the NCRP sought to
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replace. This new economic man needed to, in order to form truly
consistent preferences and logically sound probability distribu-
tions, be able to imagine all the things which could possibly
result from his decision. Yet despite this remarkable ability,
the man was still capable of making mistakes.
What we are left with is an odd paradox. And the source of
the paradox which lead to an omniscient man who is still prone to
error is the assumption that this man must maximize. Of course,
the reason why he must be assumed to maximize is that it is only
by the assumption of maximization that operational predictions
can be derived.
However, the analysis showed that the amount of scientific
knowledge capable of being gained through these operational
predictions is extremely limited. In fact, when the NCRP shifted
its focus to a normative perspective, the possibility of
scientific knowledge absolutely vanished. It was this reality
which lead us to the conclusion that perhaps Popper's system of
falsification was possibly not the "real" rhetoric of the
research program. Once that rhetoric was questioned, the odd
inconsistencies mentioned above began to surface.
What is perhaps the most suprising conclusion to be drawn
from this analysis is that modernism, by its very nature,
violates the spirit of Karl Popper's methodology of falsifica-
tionism with impunity. The origin of the break between Popper
and modernism appears to have occurred when economists decided
that the only part of Popper that mattered was the making of
predictions. But this is not at all what he meant. Predictions
are meaningless unless they are capable of testing something,
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unless they have the potential to falsify some theory. But in
the case of non-certainty research, it is extremely difficult to
falsify any theory via predictive experimentation. Thus, we find
Popper himself criticising the notion of subject probability and
risk preference.
The real essence of Popper's methodology is not prediction,
but critical thought. It is only through the criticism of theory
that theory becomes persuasive. Thus, the persuasive power of
our rhetoric must be constantly challenged. The modernist NCRP
failed for this very reason; they insulated themselves from
rhetorical criticism. By building increasingly complex models of
human behavior, the modernist NCRP postulated the one thing that
Popper argued was patently impossible, certainty. Thus, if
modernism must fall, there is no reason why Popper's thoughts
must fall with it.
In Chapter II, when the origin of economic method was
discussed, we reached the conclusion that part of the reason why
such a methodology as modernism came into being was the fear of
what was termed "truck-driver" economics. Namely, since economic
issues are ones that affect everyone deeply, and are also ones
upon which everyone thinks of themselves as expert, the modernist
methodology created a convenient "closed shop" that held all of
the "truck-driver's" arguments at bay. By arming their disci-
pline with giant main-frame computers, and requiring that
"acceptable" economic research be within the reach of only those
who possess daunting abilities in statistics and mathematics, the
modernists "solved" the problem of "truck-driver" economics by
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eliminating, prima facie, any possiblity that the truck-driver
could ever contribute anything meaningful. It is for this reason
that McCloskey labelled the modernist method as "arrogant and
pretentious" (p. 490).
But perhaps such an arrogant and pretentious method could be
tolerated if it produced some meaningful results. But this
analysis indicates quite the opposite; little knowledge has been
gained by the adherence to one method and the disposal of the
truck-driver. Simply put, modernism has lead us no closer to an
understanding of human behavior under conditions of uncertainty
than the certainty theory it seeks to replace.
But to abandon an official methodology in favor of a system
which is consciously critical of its criteria for strong argument
requires a very important proviso: Men must be assumed to be
reasonable. Without the assumption that each man is earnestly
searching for the truth, economic conversation becomes pointless.
This judgement of reasonableness is one that each reader must
make for themselves. However, what this paper has attempted to
show is that the costs of assuming reasonableness away can be
very high. In the end, we may have no choice but to trust the
integrity of those with whom we converse on matters of economics.
Finally, what suggestions present themselves for the the
future research in agricultural non-certainty? Recall the
example of the western Kansas farmer facing an imminent shortage
of water with which to irrigate his crops. Certainly the
technical matter of the future water supply should be left to the
geologists to determine. And this analysis suggests that the use
of a distributional uncertainty variable is incapable of either
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providing the scientist with objective knowledge, or of providing
the farmer any real assistance in making his decision on how to
act. Should we choose to search for insight of the character of
the decision which the decision-maker faces, it is clear that a
non-distributional uncertainty variable will have to be used.
But such insight is inherently generic in nature; the character
of the decision which this farmer faces is no different from the
character of the decision which faces the businessman who is
contemplating the purchase of new manufacturing machinery. We
should like to say something a bit more specific about the
problem which the farmer faces.
It seems that the only alternative, since we are not experts
in geology, and we recognize that predictions of this farmer's
behavior are, if not impossible, then meaningless; is to opt for
a classif icatory scheme. How have producer's in the past
responded to situations where the supply of a crucial input
suddenly decreased? What have been the consequences of these
responses? And finally, how well does the situation of the
farmer parallel these historical cases? The number of questions
which present themselves is limited only by the imagination of
the economist. And what is so exciting is that these research
possibilities only become possible when we loose ourselves from
the burdens of an "official" rhetoric.
In all, the situation of the entreprenuer appears to be no
different from the situation of the economist. Our imaginations
create the future. And just as it is folly to predict scientific
discoveries that haven't yet been made, so to it is folly to
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predict decisions that have not been made.
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ABSTRACT
The classic definition of rhetoric is much different than
the sense with which the word is used today. The ancients
considered rhetoric to be a fine and honorable word; rhetoric
was the art of persuasive argument. This thesis, using the old
definition of the word, considers the rhetoric of the current
economic research in agricultural non-certainty. Specifically,
the paper seeks to identify and criticise the standards of
persuasive argument currently used in this research area.
In order to identify what the standards of persuasive
argument are in the Non-Certainty Research Program (NCRP), it is
necessary to first come to terms with what has been called the
"official" rhetoric of economics. Called "modernism," the
official rhetoric insists that good arguments in economics
always contain theories which attempt to predict the behavior of
individuals. The value of a theory is then the success it has
in predicting individual behavior.
Hence, this thesis seeks to identify the essence of
modernism and to evaluate the adherence of the NCRP to its
methodological rules. First, we show that modernism is indeed
the "official" rhetoric of economics. Additionally, there is
some speculuation as to why an "official" rhetoric might be
considered necessary in a discipline like economics. Secondly,
a chapter goes into detailed discussion of the philosophical
foundations for modernism.
1
When the NCRP is judged by the standards of modernism, the
analysis shows that it fails this test convincingly. Moreover,
despite its vaulted reputation, modernism is shown to be, at
least within the NCRP, just a cover for the "real" rhetoric of
economics. We show that this real rhetoric inserts truth a
priori into the assumptions of the theory. Given this
philosophical stance, the justification emerges for a criticism
of those assumptions, especially the dual notions of expected
utility and subjective probability. The thesis concludes with
a compendium of criticism of these two ideas.
Finally, the concluding chapter suggests that further
research, rather than attempting to predict behavior, should opt
for what has been called a classif icatory scheme. Rather, than
attempting to predict future occurrences, theory should identify
links of similiarity between the current problem situation and a
scene in the past where economic agents faced similiar
circumstances
.
